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WHEN RUBBER MEETS THE ROAD: BALANCING 
INNOVATION AND PUBLIC SAFETY IN THE 
REGULATION OF SELF-DRIVING CARS 
Abstract: The prospect of self-driving vehicles operating on our roadways brings 
with it both promise and risks. One of the most prominent risks is ensuring that 
an appropriate regulatory scheme is in place to permit manufacturers to test and 
deploy self-driving cars on public roadways while minimizing safety threats to 
the public. Currently, self-driving cars are operating under a regulatory frame-
work designed for vehicles driven by humans. Legislative proposals have been 
put forth to remove barriers and adjust the present self-certification model of 
compliance to fit self-driving cars. This Note explores the current state of the 
regulatory system for self-driving cars and legislative proposals to change it. It 
argues that a type approval process, similar to the practice used by the Federal 
Aviation Administration for aircraft, would serve as a useful regulatory model to 
ensure public safety without constraining innovation. 
INTRODUCTION 
Humans are responsible for ninety-four percent of motor vehicle crashes.1 
With 37,133 fatalities on U.S. roadways in 2017, even a modest reduction in 
human error could have significant benefits for society overall.2 Accordingly, it 
is not surprising that the prospect of self-driving cars replacing careless, dis-
tracted, and slow-to-react human-driven cars has created so much excitement.3 
A self-driving car can see 360 degrees at all times, never gets distracted or 
                                                                                                                           
 1 NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., CRITICAL REASONS FOR CRASHES INVESTIGATED 
IN THE NATIONAL MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH CAUSATION SURVEY 1 (Feb. 2015), https://crashstats.
nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/812115 [https://perma.cc/4RZU-4DVX].  
 2 See U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE OF TRANSPORTATION: AUTOMATED 
VEHICLES 3.0, at 1 (2018) [hereinafter AV GUIDANCE 3.0], https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/
files/docs/policy-initiatives/automated-vehicles/320711/preparing-future-transportation-automated-
vehicle-30.pdf [https://perma.cc/7SMM-S8FF] (discussing traffic fatalities).  
 3 See Stuart Dredge, Elon Musk: Self-Driving Cars Could Lead to Ban on Human Drivers, THE 
GUARDIAN (Mar. 18, 2015, 3:22 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/mar/18/elon-
musk-self-driving-cars-ban-human-drivers [https://perma.cc/C4GU-QHNC] (noting that the prolifera-
tion of self-driving cars may require human driven cars to be banned). Numerous companies are test-
ing self-driving vehicle prototypes and billions of dollars are pouring in to self-driving car startups. 
See Testing of Autonomous Vehicles with a Driver, CAL. DEP’T OF MOTOR VEHICLES, https://www.
dmv.ca.gov/portal/dmv/detail/vr/autonomous/testing [https://perma.cc/AFV8-CBLF] (noting that, as 
of December 5, 2019, sixty-five entities have permits to test automated vehicles in California); Neal E. 
Boudette, Honda Putting $2.75 Billion into G.M.’s Self-Driving Venture, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2018, at 
B4 (discussing Honda’s investment of $2.75 billion into G.M. Cruise Holdings, a subsidiary of Gen-
eral Motors focused on developing automated vehicles). 
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tired, and can react instantaneously.4 That is at least how a self-driving car is 
supposed to work.5 
On March 18, 2018, Elaine Herzberg became the first pedestrian fatality 
from a self-driving car, when she was struck and killed by an automated Uber 
test vehicle operating with its automated driving system engaged.6 Herzberg 
was crossing a street at night and not within a crosswalk when she was struck.7 
The automated driving system failed to detect Herzberg as she crossed the 
street, and the safety driver conducting the testing appeared to be distracted 
and not monitoring the roadway.8 Arizona Governor Doug Ducey subsequently 
suspended Uber’s testing operations in Arizona on March 26, 2018.9 Two 
months later, on May 23, 2018, Uber announced that it was ending its auto-
mated vehicle testing program in Arizona.10 The accident demonstrates that, 
even though they may hold great promise for society, self-driving cars also 
pose a danger to the public when they malfunction.11 
When rubber meets the road, lawmakers must answer the question of how 
to regulate self-driving cars.12 Current regulations are concerned with vehicles 
designed to operate safely in the hands of human drivers, but future regulations 
must make sure that computer drivers operate vehicles safely in the presence 
of humans.13 
                                                                                                                           
 4 Technology, WAYMO, https://waymo.com/tech/ [https://perma.cc/Y6ZR-BYSN] (noting that its 
sensors are designed to “scan constantly for objects around the vehicle—pedestrians, cyclists, vehi-
cles, road work, obstructions—and continuously read traffic controls, from traffic light color and 
railroad crossing gates to temporary stop signs” and that its “vehicles can see up to three football 
fields away in every direction”). 
 5 See Daisuke Wakabayashi, Self-Driving Uber Car Kills Pedestrian in Arizona, Where Robots 
Roam, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2018, at A1 (discussing an accident where a self-driving Uber prototype 
operating with a human monitor struck and killed a pedestrian). 
 6 Troy Griggs & Daisuke Wakabayashi, How a Self-Driving Uber Killed a Pedestrian in Arizona, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/03/20/us/self-driving-uber-
pedestrian-killed.html [https://perma.cc/2YDG-EUM6]. 
 7 Ryan Randazzo, Victim of Self-Driving Uber Accident Could Be to Blame, Expert Says, USA 
TODAY (Mar. 23, 2018, 4:20 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/nation-now/2018/03/23/self-
driving-uber-pedestrian-accident/453319002/ [https://perma.cc/JR89-S6EZ]. 
 8 Griggs & Wakabayashi, supra note 6. 
 9 Alejandro Lazo & Greg Bensinger, Arizona Governor Suspends Uber’s Self-Driving Cars from 
Roads, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 26, 2018, 10:51 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/arizona-governor-
suspends-ubers-self-driving-cars-from-roads-1522113198 [https://perma.cc/BP58-95PE]. 
 10 Marco della Cava & Ryan Randazzo, Uber to Shut Down Self-Driving Car Operation in Arizo-
na After Fatality, USA TODAY (May 23, 2018, 6:43 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/
2018/05/23/uber-shut-down-self-driving-car-operation-arizona-after-fatality/637122002/ [https://perma.
cc/U3E6-M2MG]. 
 11 See Wakabayashi, supra note 5, (discussing the promise of self-driving cars and the fatality in 
Arizona). 
 12 See AV GUIDANCE 3.0, supra note 2, at 7 (detailing proposals to regulate self-driving cars). 
 13 See id. (noting that future standards will need to take into account where the vehicle is capable 
of driving itself and that performance-based standards may be needed to test the capabilities of auto-
mated vehicles). 
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This Note explores the current state of the regulatory system for self-
driving cars and evaluates proposals to adapt it to a driverless future.14 Part I 
gives an overview of the classification system for self-driving cars and dis-
cusses the current automotive regulatory regime and proposals in Congress to 
modify it.15 Part II discusses the objectives of regulating self-driving cars, ex-
plores the challenges of balancing competing goals, and examines current policy 
as well as proposed legislative and regulatory actions.16 Part III assesses type 
approval, the process used by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to ap-
prove aircraft designs, as a possible mechanism for regulating self-driving cars.17 
I. THE STATE OF PLAY FOR AUTOMATED VEHICLES 
This Part provides an overview of the classification system for self-
driving cars as well as the current federal regulatory and legislative environ-
ment.18 Section A details the framework for categorizing self-driving cars.19 
Section B discusses the federal framework for regulating motor vehicles.20 
Section C considers barriers to the proliferation of self-driving cars in the con-
text of the federal regulatory framework for motor vehicles.21 Section D re-
views actions taken by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
(NHTSA) to clarify policy and remove barriers for self-driving cars.22 Section 
E details congressional proposals to adjust the federal regulatory framework to 
accommodate self-driving cars.23 
A. Understanding the SAE Definitional and Taxonomical Framework 
Self-driving cars may have differing capabilities and various use cases, 
which necessitated the development of standardized definitions and taxonomy 
for driving automation systems.24 Industry members, policymakers, and regu-
                                                                                                                           
 14 See infra notes 18–334 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 18–129 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 130–285 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 286–334 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 18–129 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 24–43 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 44–52 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 53–63 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 64–75 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 79–129 and accompanying text. 
 24 See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF POLICY CON-
CERNING AUTOMATED VEHICLES 4 (2013) [hereinafter PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF POLICY CON-
CERNING AUTOMATED VEHICLES], http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/rulemaking/pdf/Automated_
Vehicles_Policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/FU8Q-6WAE] (discussing how levels of automation serve the 
need “for clarity in discussing [automated vehicles] with other stakeholders”). In this document, 
NHTSA originally settled on five levels of automation numbered 0–4. Id. at 4–5. In September 2016, 
NHTSA released FEDERAL AUTOMATED VEHICLES POLICY, a guidance document that superseded its 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF POLICY CONCERNING AUTOMATED VEHICLES. See NAT’L HIGHWAY 
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lators have coalesced around the definitional and taxonomical framework de-
veloped by SAE International (SAE) to guide the discussion.25 
SAE begins by identifying three main actors that could be involved in 
driving: a human driver, a driving automation system, and vehicle systems and 
components that do not include a driving automation system.26 Each of the 
three actors is capable of performing all or part of what SAE terms the dynam-
ic driving task.27 The dynamic driving task includes all of the decision making 
and inputs needed to operate a vehicle in on-road traffic.28 More specifically, 
                                                                                                                           
TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., FEDERAL AUTOMATED VEHICLES POLICY 10–11 (2016) [hereinafter AV 
GUIDANCE 1.0], https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/AV%20policy%20guidance
%20PDF.pdf [https://perma.cc/ET4S-XUYV] (discussing the scope and effective dates of the docu-
ment). In AV GUIDANCE 1.0, NHTSA adopted the SAE levels of automation and noted that scattered 
terminology necessitated the adoption of uniform definitions. Id. at 9; see also SAE INT’L, J3016: 
TAXONOMY AND DEFINITIONS FOR TERMS RELATED TO DRIVING AUTOMATION SYSTEMS FOR ON-
ROAD MOTOR VEHICLES 2 (June 2018) [hereinafter J3016], https://www.sae.org/standards/content/
j3016_201806/ [https://perma.cc/2W46-9PE9] (discussing the levels of automation). SAE Internation-
al, formerly known as the Society of Automotive Engineers, is an organization devoted to, among 
other things, sharing information and developing standards for engineers in the automotive and aero-
space industries. About SAE International, SAE INT’L, https://www.sae.org/about/history [https://
perma.cc/4AU6-PUAY]. NHTSA and the Department of Transportation (DOT) released three subse-
quent versions of guidance documents and each adopted the SAE levels of automation. See NAT’L 
HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., AUTOMATED DRIVING SYSTEMS 2.0: A VISION FOR SAFETY 4 
(2017) [hereinafter AV GUIDANCE 2.0], https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/documents/
13069a-ads2.0_090617_v9a_tag.pdf [https://perma.cc/F6MY-W8QP] (utilizing the SAE levels of 
automation); AV GUIDANCE 3.0, supra note 2, at vi (same); U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., ENSURING 
AMERICAN LEADERSHIP IN AUTOMATED VEHICLE TECHNOLOGIES: AUTOMATED VEHICLES 4.0, at 
13–14, 18 (2020) [hereinafter AV GUIDANCE 4.0], https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/
files/docs/policy-initiatives/automated-vehicles/360956/ensuringamericanleadershipav4.pdf [https://
perma.cc/QRQ8-WE7F] (same). While AV GUIDANCE 2.0 updated and replaced AV GUIDANCE 1.0, 
AV GUIDANCE 3.0 “builds upon—but does not replace—voluntary guidance provided in” AV GUID-
ANCE 2.0. AV GUIDANCE 3.0, supra note 2, at viii; see AV GUIDANCE 2.0, supra, at 1 (noting that the 
document “updates the Federal Automated Vehicles Policy released in September 2016 and serves as 
NHTSA’s current operating guidance for ADSs”). Similarly, AV GUIDANCE 4.0 supplements, rather 
than supersedes, AV GUIDANCE 2.0 and AV GUIDANCE 3.0. AV GUIDANCE 4.0, supra, at 1. 
 25 See e.g., TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 545.451 (West 2017) (defining Automated Driving Sys-
tem (ADS) using J3016 terminology, including “dynamic driving task”); AV GUIDANCE 3.0, supra 
note 2, at vi (using the SAE levels of automation). 
 26 J3016, supra note 24, at 2. 
 27 See id. (discussing the role of the primary actors). SAE defines dynamic driving task as:  
All of the real-time operational and tactical functions required to operate a vehicle in 
on-road traffic, excluding the strategic functions such as trip scheduling and selection 
of destinations and waypoints, and including without limitation: Lateral vehicle motion 
control via steering (operational); Longitudinal vehicle motion control via acceleration 
and deceleration (operational); Monitoring the driving environment via object and event 
detection, recognition, classification, and response preparation (operational and tacti-
cal); Object and event response execution (operational and tactical); Maneuver planning 
(tactical); and Enhancing conspicuity via lighting, signaling and gesturing, etc. (tacti-
cal).  
Id. at 6. 
 28 See id. at 6 (defining dynamic driving task).  
2020] Regulation of Self-Driving Cars 299 
an actor performing the entire dynamic driving task will control the vehicle’s 
longitudinal and lateral movement, monitor the roadway and surroundings by 
detecting objects and events, respond to objects and events by executing ma-
neuvers, and increase visibility and communicate to other actors through light-
ing or signaling when necessary.29 
SAE has identified six levels of driving automation, numbered 0–5, that 
evolve sequentially depending on (1) whether the driving automation system 
performs some or all of the subparts of the dynamic driving task on a sustained 
basis, (2) whether the actor that performs the dynamic driving task fallback in 
the case of a system failure is a human driver or the system itself, and (3) 
whether the driving automation system is limited in its operational design do-
main.30 Operational design domain refers to where the automated vehicle can 
operate and the conditions in which it can operate.31 
At SAE level 0, or No Driving Automation, a human driver performs the 
entire dynamic driving task.32 At SAE level 1, or Driver Assistance, the driving 
automation system controls either the longitudinal or lateral movement of the 
                                                                                                                           
 29 Id. SAE uses the term object and event detection and response as an umbrella term for the dy-
namic driving task functions related to monitoring and responding to objects and events. Id. at 7. 
 30 See id. at 21–23 (discussing the role of the human driver and the driving automation system in 
the context of each level of automation). Dynamic driving task fallback is defined as the “response by 
the user to either perform the [dynamic driving task] or achieve a minimal risk condition after occur-
rence of a [dynamic driving task] performance-relevant system failure(s) or upon operational design 
domain (ODD) exit, or the response by an ADS to achieve minimal risk condition, given the same 
circumstances.” Id. at 7. A minimal risk condition is “[a] condition to which a user or an ADS may 
bring a vehicle after performing the [dynamic driving task] fallback in order to reduce the risk of a 
crash when a given trip cannot or should not be completed.” Id. at 11. A minimal risk condition de-
pends on which feature is installed in the automated vehicle and may involve, for example, immedi-
ately stopping in the roadway, moving over to and stopping on the shoulder of the roadway, or return-
ing itself to a marshalling facility. Id. Operational design domain is the “[o]perating conditions under 
which a given driving automation system or feature thereof is specifically designed to function, in-
cluding, but not limited to, environmental, geographical, and time-of-day restrictions, and/or the req-
uisite presence or absence of certain traffic or roadway characteristics.” Id. at 14. 
 31 Id. at 14.  
 32 J3016, supra note 24, at 19. For example, the original Ford Model T would be classified as 
SAE level 0 because it does not have a driving automation system installed and a human driver is 
always responsible for all of the dynamic driving task. See id. at 20 (classifying features that do not 
control the dynamic driving task). SAE level 0 could also include a vehicle that has active safety sys-
tems installed that do not operate on a sustained basis—such as an automatic emergency braking sys-
tem—that are only designed to take over longitudinal control of the vehicle in certain situations. See 
id. at 21 (noting that a vehicle classified as SAE level 0 could have “other . . . systems [installed that] 
may provide warnings or support, such as momentary emergency intervention”); see also Driver As-
sistance Technologies, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., https://www.nhtsa.gov/equipment/
driver-assistance-technologies [https://perma.cc/8B2J-TSDL] (“Automatic emergency braking (AEB) 
systems detect an impending forward crash with another vehicle in time to avoid or mitigate the crash. 
These systems first alert the driver to take corrective action and supplement the driver’s braking to 
avoid the crash. If the driver does not respond, the AEB system may automatically apply the brakes to 
assist in preventing or reducing the severity of a crash.”). 
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vehicle on a sustained basis—but not both.33 Most cars on the road today, spe-
cifically those that only have a cruise control system installed, fall under SAE 
level 0 because cruise control cannot operate on a sustained basis by changing 
its speed to respond to roadway events.34 At SAE level 2, or Partial Driving 
Automation, the driving automation system controls both the longitudinal and 
lateral movement of the vehicle on a sustained basis.35 Similar to SAE level 1, 
an SAE level 2 feature has a limited operational design domain and requires a 
human driver to perform the entire dynamic driving task in the case of a driv-
ing automation system failure.36 
The remainder of this Note focuses on SAE levels 3–5, which apply to 
vehicles truly capable of self-driving.37 SAE level 3, or Conditional Driving 
Automation, is the first level at which an Automated Driving System (ADS) 
performs the entire dynamic driving task when the ADS is engaged and operat-
ing in a limited operational design domain.38 A human driver must be available 
                                                                                                                           
 33 J3016, supra note 24, at 19. Object and event detection and response, the other subpart of the 
dynamic driving task, is performed by the human driver in SAE level 1, as is the entire dynamic driv-
ing task in the case of a driving automation system failure. Id. An SAE level 1 feature is also limited 
in its operational design domain. Id. For example, adaptive cruise control would be classified as an 
SAE level 1 driving automation system because it can control the longitudinal movement of the vehi-
cle on an ongoing basis, but requires a human driver to control lateral movement and perform object 
and event detection and response by monitoring the roadway. See id. at 2 (noting “a driver who fails 
to monitor the roadway during engagement of a level 1 adaptive cruise control (ACC) system still has 
the role of driver, even while s/he is neglecting it”). Adaptive cruise control requires a human driver 
to be ready to resume the entire dynamic driving task should there be a system failure. See id. at 8 
(discussing dynamic driving task fallback). Adaptive cruise control also has a limited operational 
design domain (freeways, for example). See id. at 26 (noting that adaptive cruise control “may be 
intended to operate only at high speeds, only at low speeds, or at all speeds”). 
 34 See id. at 15 (discussing cruise control). 
 35 Id. at 19. An SAE level 2 feature does not perform the complete object and event detection and 
response subtask and requires a human driver to supervise the driving automation system and perform 
all object and event detection and response that the feature is not designed to handle. See id. (discuss-
ing the human driver’s role). For example, Tesla’s Autopilot is an SAE level 2 feature because it re-
quires a human driver to, at all times, perform object and event detection and response. See TESLA, 
MODEL S OWNER’S MANUAL 82 (rev. Oct. 30, 2019), https://www.tesla.com/sites/default/files/
model_s_owners_manual_north_america_en_us.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7W6-VWVW] (noting that 
“[i]t is the driver’s responsibility to stay alert, drive safely, and be in control of the vehicle at all 
times”). Autopilot is a suite of features including: Traffic-Aware Cruise Control, Autosteer, and Au-
topark. Id. Tesla warns that Autosteer is a “hands on feature . . . intended for use only on highways 
and limited-access roads with a fully attentive driver,” which indicates that, although Autopilot fea-
tures may be capable of performing longitudinal and lateral control, Autopilot cannot perform the 
complete object and event detection and response subtask and a human driver must complete the re-
mainder of the dynamic driving task. Id. at 91. 
 36 J3016, supra note 24, at 19. 
 37 See id. at 3 (noting that an ADS, classified as levels 3–5, is capable of performing the entire 
dynamic driving task and object and event detection and response). Hereinafter, this Note will use the 
term “automated vehicles” to refer to vehicles containing an SAE level 3–5 ADS. 
 38 Id. at 19. SAE notes that “[t]he upper three levels of driving automation (3–5) refer to cases in 
which the Automated Driving System (ADS) performs the entire . . . [dynamic driving task] on a sus-
tained basis while it is engaged.” Id. at 24. An SAE level 3 feature could include an ADS capable of 
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and be capable of performing the dynamic driving task fallback in the case of 
an ADS failure or when the vehicle exits its operational design domain.39 At 
SAE level 4, or High Driving Automation, an ADS performs the entire dynam-
ic driving task while it is engaged and the vehicle is operating in its limited 
operational design domain.40 The key difference between SAE levels 3 and 4 is 
that in SAE level 4 the ADS, and not a human driver, performs the dynamic 
driving task fallback and must be capable of achieving a minimal risk condi-
tion without intervention by a human driver.41 At SAE level 5, or Full Driving 
Automation, an ADS performs the entire dynamic driving task and also the 
dynamic driving task fallback.42 The only difference between SAE levels 4 and 
5 is that an SAE level 5 ADS has an unlimited operational design domain, 
meaning that the vehicle can operate under all conditions, including anywhere 
a human driver could take it.43 
                                                                                                                           
operating in freeway traffic jam conditions. See id. at 8 (discussing a level 3 traffic jam feature); Audi 
Piloted Driving, AUDI, https://media.audiusa.com/models/piloted-driving [https://perma.cc/NW5U-
Q9TT] (discussing an SAE level 3 traffic jam feature). Audi’s Traffic Jam Pilot feature handles the 
complete dynamic driving task when operating in its operational design domain and a human driver is 
only required to resume control after receiving a request to intervene. See Audi Piloted Driving, supra 
(discussing the role of the human driver). Traffic Jam Pilot operates in a limited operational design 
domain that includes freeways with physical barriers in the median and only at speeds lower than 
thirty-five miles per hour. See id. (detailing the functionality of the traffic jam pilot feature). 
 39 See J3016, supra note 24, at 19 (noting the role of the human driver at SAE level 3). At SAE 
level 3, “[t]he [dynamic driving task] fallback-ready user . . . is expected to be prepared to either re-
sume the [dynamic driving task] when the ADS issues a request to intervene or to perform the fallback 
and achieve a minimal risk condition if the failure condition precludes normal operation.” Id. at 24. 
 40 See id. at 19 (charting the roles of human driver and ADS). A vehicle with an SAE level 4 
feature installed is capable of operating in a geographic area without the need for a human to assume 
control in the case of a system failure. See id. at 22 (discussing the role of a passenger). For example, 
a vehicle with an SAE level 4 feature installed and operating in a ridesharing platform could be sum-
moned by using a mobile phone application and drive the user to his or her destination, as long as the 
route between the pick-up and drop-off location is within the vehicle’s operational design domain. See 
Jamie L. LaReau, How General Motors Is Leading the Race for Self-Driving Cars, DETROIT FREE 
PRESS (Jul. 19, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.freep.com/story/money/cars/general-motors/2018/07/19/
general-motors-cruise-av-autonomous-car/782570002/ [https://perma.cc/2LQ9-W5B8] (detailing 
ridesharing use cases for automated vehicles). Both Cruise—a subsidiary of General Motors—and 
Waymo—a subsidiary of Alphabet (the holding company for Google)—are working to develop SAE 
level 4 vehicles to operate in a ridesharing platform. See id. (discussing Cruise’s vehicles and their use 
cases); WAYMO, Waymo Safety Report: On the Road to Full Self-Driving 13, 16 (2018), https://
storage.googleapis.com/sdc-prod/v1/safety-report/Safety%20Report%202018.pdf [https://perma.cc/
97S3-NZEA] (discussing Waymo’s vehicles and the company’s strategy). 
 41 See J3016, supra note 24, at 19, 22 (comparing SAE levels 3 and 4); see also supra text ac-
companying note 30 (describing dynamic driving task fallback and a minimal risk condition). 
 42 J3016, supra note 24, at 19. 
 43 See id. (charting the differences between SAE levels 4 and 5). Because a vehicle equipped with 
an SAE level 5 feature would be able to operate anywhere, some industry experts, including Waymo 
CEO John Krafcik, speculate that an SAE level 5 feature may take decades to develop, or that such a 
feature may not be capable of development. See Mark Gurman, Waymo CEO Says Self-Driving Cars 
Won’t Be Ubiquitous for Decades, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 13, 2018, 12:53 PM), https://www.bloomberg.
com/news/articles/2018-11-13/waymo-ceo-says-self-driving-cars-won-t-be-ubiqitious-for-decades 
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B. Federal Regulation of Motor Vehicles 
The origins of the regulatory system for motor vehicles in the United 
States can be traced back to the Highway Safety Act of 1966 and the National 
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (Vehicle Safety Act), signed into 
law by President Lyndon B. Johnson.44 The Highway Safety Act of 1966 and 
Vehicle Safety Act created the National Highway Safety Bureau, which subse-
quently became NHTSA.45 NHTSA is tasked with promulgating safety stand-
ards for motor vehicles that are known as Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Stand-
ards (FMVSS).46 FMVSS are minimum safety requirements for motor vehicles 
and motor vehicle equipment.47 
The Vehicle Safety Act creates a self-certification system for motor vehi-
cle manufacturers to comply with FMVSS.48 To self-certify, a motor vehicle 
manufacturer is required to affix a label to each newly produced vehicle attest-
ing that the vehicle complies with FMVSS.49 The self-certification system, 
however, does not permit NHTSA to pre-approve the manner in which manu-
facturers comply with FMVSS.50 Instead, NHTSA selects vehicles from the 
on-road fleet to test for compliance with FMVSS and undertakes enforcement 
actions in cases of non-compliance or if it discovers defects that may result in 
                                                                                                                           
[https://perma.cc/V5YT-6U9Y] (noting Krafcik theorizes that an automated vehicle may never be able 
to operate in all weather conditions).  
 44 Understanding the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), U.S. DEP’T OF 
TRANSP., https://www.transportation.gov/transition/understanding-national-highway-traffic-safety-
administration-nhtsa [https://perma.cc/Z89F-YUFJ]. The November 30, 1965, publication of the book 
Unsafe at Any Speed: The Designed-In Dangers of the American Automobile by Ralph Nader, which 
discussed the tendency of the Chevrolet Corvair to roll over, is seen as a watershed moment in the 
push for an increased government role in automotive safety. Christopher Jensen, 50 Years Ago, ‘Un-
safe at Any Speed’ Shook the Auto World, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2015, at B3. 
 45 Understanding the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), supra note 44. 
 46 See 49 U.S.C. § 30111 (2018) (vesting authority in the Secretary of Transportation to promul-
gate regulations); NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., QUICK REFERENCE GUIDE (2010 VER-
SION) TO FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS AND REGULATIONS, at ii (2011) [hereinaf-
ter QUICK REFERENCE GUIDE], https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/fmvss-quickrefguide-
hs811439.pdf [https://perma.cc/R3ND-GTXE] (noting NHTSA’s authority to promulgate FMVSS 
arises from Title 49). The first FMVSS, No. 209 for Seat Belt Assemblies, became effective March 1, 
1967. QUICK REFERENCE GUIDE, supra, at ii.  
 47 QUICK REFERENCE GUIDE, supra note 46, at ii. 
 48 See 49 U.S.C. § 30115 (“A manufacturer or distributor of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle 
equipment shall certify to the distributor or dealer at delivery that the vehicle or equipment complies 
with applicable motor vehicle safety standards prescribed under this chapter.”).  
 49 49 C.F.R. § 567.4 (2018). The regulation requires the following statement for passenger cars: 
“This vehicle conforms to all applicable Federal motor vehicle safety, bumper, and theft prevention 
standards in effect on the date of manufacture shown above.” Id. 
 50 NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., UNDERSTANDING NHTSA’S REGULATORY 
TOOLS: INSTRUCTIONS, PRACTICAL GUIDANCE, AND ASSISTANCE FOR ENTITIES SEEKING TO EM-
PLOY NHTSA’S REGULATORY TOOLS 2 (2017) [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING NHTSA’S REGULATO-
RY TOOLS], https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/documents/understanding_nhtsas_current_
regulatory_tools-tag.pdf [https://perma.cc/GNP6-7FRB]. 
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an unreasonable risk to safety.51 NHTSA also possesses broad enforcement 
authority and the ability to conduct recalls, even in the absence of applicable 
FMVSS, if it determines a defect poses an unreasonable risk to safety.52 
C. Federal Regulatory Impediments to Automated Vehicles 
Current FMVSS were developed with human drivers in mind and include 
some equipment requirements, such as manual controls, that are not necessary 
for a vehicle equipped with an SAE level 4 or level 5 ADS, which can perform 
both the dynamic driving task and the dynamic driving task fallback.53 As a 
result, questions arise whether automated vehicles that lack manual controls 
could be certified to comply with FMVSS.54 If a manufacturer believes that 
FMVSS are an impediment to the introduction of an advanced technology, 
such as an ADS feature, the manufacturer’s current course of action is limited 
to the regulatory tools NHTSA has at its disposal.55 NHTSA can conduct rule-
making to amend or create new FMVSS, grant exemptions from FMVSS, or 
interpret FMVSS via interpretation letters.56 
Rulemaking, however, is a time-consuming course of action because it 
requires extensive research by NHTSA and adherence to the Administrative 
Procedures Act, which may not be ideal for technology that is rapidly evolv-
ing.57 NHTSA recognizes that future rulemaking for automated vehicles must 
be faster and more nimble to accommodate rapidly evolving technology, alt-
                                                                                                                           
 51 Id. 
 52 AV GUIDANCE 1.0, supra note 24, at 50. 
 53 See ANITA KIM ET AL., REVIEW OF FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS (FMVSS) 
FOR AUTOMATED VEHICLES: IDENTIFYING POTENTIAL BARRIERS AND CHALLENGES FOR THE CERTI-
FICATION OF AUTOMATED VEHICLES USING EXISTING FMVSS, at viii–ix (2016) (noting “that there 
are few barriers for automated vehicles to comply with FMVSS, as long as the vehicle does not signif-
icantly diverge from a conventional vehicle design” but “[a]utomated vehicles that begin to push the 
boundaries of conventional design (e.g., alternative cabin layouts, omission of manual controls) would 
be constrained by the current FMVSS or may conflict with policy objectives of the FMVSS”). 
 54 See Letter from Chris Urmson, Dir., Self-Driving Car Project, Google, Inc., to Paul A. Hem-
mersbaugh, Chief Counsel, Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin. 2 (Nov. 12, 2015), https://www.
autosafety.org/sites/default/files/imce_staff_uploads/Google%20NHTSA%20letter%2012%20Nov%
202016.pdf [https://perma.cc/4HYG-NW25] (requesting an interpretation of several FMVSS as they 
relate to automated vehicles). 
 55 See UNDERSTANDING NHTSA’S REGULATORY TOOLS, supra note 50, at 2 (discussing the 
regulatory tools available to NHTSA). 
 56 Id. 
 57 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553–557 (2018) (discussing rulemaking); George Soodoo, A Primer on the 
NHTSA Rulemaking Process, ENO CTR. FOR TRANSP. (Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.enotrans.org/article/
primer-nhtsa-rulemaking-process/ [https://perma.cc/YK3V-BUD8] (discussing steps in the rulemak-
ing process at NHTSA). Rulemaking of moderate complexity may take a minimum of five years be-
cause, in addition to conducting large amounts of research, the Administrative Procedures Act re-
quires NHTSA to “1) publish in the Federal Register [a notice of proposed rulemaking] that provides 
details about its proposal; 2) give the public an opportunity to comment on the proposal; and 3) pub-
lish the final rule.” Soodoo, supra. 
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hough it has not yet determined how best to streamline the process.58 NHTSA 
may also issue exemptions from compliance with one or more FMVSS under 
circumstances that are usually temporary and small in number.59 A manufac-
turer may receive a temporary exemption—limited to 2,500 vehicles—from 
FMVSS for two years for the purpose of testing a new safety feature with a 
safety level at least equal to the applicable FMVSS or if the manufacturer can 
provide an analysis showing that the exempted vehicle is at least as safe as a 
non-exempt vehicle overall.60 Interpretation letters are the narrowest of 
NHTSA’s tools and sought when a manufacturer is interested in clarifying how 
NHTSA believes a statute or regulation applies to its product.61 Although ex-
emptions and interpretation requests are a faster course of action than rulemak-
ing, both typically take NHTSA years to process.62 To clear interpretation-
related obstacles to automated vehicles that offer improved safety, NHTSA 
adopted a new policy whereby the agency will attempt to respond to simple 
ADS interpretation requests within sixty days and complex ADS interpretation 
requests within ninety days.63 
                                                                                                                           
 58 See AV GUIDANCE 3.0, supra note 2, at 7 (discussing new approaches to creating FMVSS, and 
noting performance standards or testing standards as possibilities). 
 59 UNDERSTANDING NHTSA’S REGULATORY TOOLS, supra note 50, at 8. 
 60 Id. at 9. Under 49 U.S.C. § 30112(b)(10), which was enacted in 2015, “the introduction of a 
motor vehicle in interstate commerce solely for purposes of testing or evaluation by a manufacturer 
that agrees not to sell or offer for sale the motor vehicle at the conclusion of the testing or evaluation” 
is permitted without compliance with FMVSS so long as the manufacturer “has manufactured and 
distributed motor vehicles into the United States that are certified to comply with all applicable Feder-
al motor vehicle safety standards” when the statute was enacted. 49 U.S.C. § 30112(b)(10) (2018). 
The statute effectively permits established manufacturers (and likely only automakers), as of Decem-
ber 4, 2015, to operate non-FMVSS compliant vehicles for testing and evaluation without NHTSA’s 
permission. See id. (exempting established manufacturers). Non-established manufacturers—such as 
Waymo or other startup companies that do not manufacture and distribute vehicles as a regular part of 
their business—would still need permission from NHTSA to do so. See id. (applying the exemption 
only to those who make and distribute FMVSS compliant vehicles). 
 61 See UNDERSTANDING NHTSA’S REGULATORY TOOLS, supra note 50, at 5 (discussing the 
purpose of interpretation requests). An interpretation letter “may clarify a statutory or regulatory term 
or provide sharper and more detailed lines than the regulation or statute it interprets. An interpretation 
may not, however, make a substantive change to a statute or regulation or to their clear provisions and 
requirements.” Id. 
 62 See AV GUIDANCE 1.0, supra note 24, at 103 n.3 (noting the timeframe for exemptions and 
interpretation requests).  
 63 UNDERSTANDING NHTSA’S REGULATORY TOOLS, supra note 50, at 7. Factors considered to 
determine processing time and whether the interpretation request is simple or complex include: (1) 
“whether the information and justification provided is adequate for [NHTSA] to assess the merits of 
granting or denying the request,” (2) “whether [NHTSA] is deciding on an exemption request consist-
ently with prior decisions on prior similar requests, if any, and whether such a decision remains con-
sistent with [NHTSA]’s best current thinking on the topic,” (3) “[c]omplexity of the exemption re-
quest and issues presented” and (4) “[NHTSA] workload.” Id. at 10. 
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D. Federal Guidance Documents for Automated Vehicles 
NHTSA and the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) issued a pre-
liminary statement of policy and four guidance documents to inform interested 
parties of issues the agency sees in the development of ADS and to define the 
federal government’s future role.64 Released in 2013, the first guidance docu-
ment details fifteen safety-related areas—such as privacy, system safety, and 
crashworthiness—that entities developing ADSs should consider during the 
design process.65 NHTSA requests that entities developing ADSs voluntarily 
submit a Safety Assessment Letter detailing whether the ADS complies or fails 
to comply with these guidance areas, or whether the guidance area is inappli-
cable to the ADS being developed.66 Although submission is presented as vol-
untary, NHTSA expects that manufacturers submit a Safety Assessment Letter 
at least four months before on-road testing of an ADS and submit new Safety 
Assessment Letters when significant updates are made to the ADS.67 NHTSA 
notes that rulemaking to make the Safety Assessment Letter mandatory, rather 
than voluntary, is possible.68 
Following the transition to the administration of President Donald J. 
Trump, NHTSA released a second guidance document that superseded the pri-
or version.69 In this second guidance document, NHTSA winnows down the 
fifteen safety assessment areas to twelve safety elements.70 NHTSA also 
                                                                                                                           
 64 AV GUIDANCE 2.0, supra note 24; AV GUIDANCE 1.0, supra note 24; PRELIMINARY STATE-
MENT OF POLICY CONCERNING AUTOMATED VEHICLES, supra note 24; AV GUIDANCE 4.0, supra 
note 24; AV GUIDANCE 3.0, supra note 2; see also supra text accompanying note 24 (discussing the 
succession of policy and guidance documents). 
 65 AV GUIDANCE 1.0, supra note 24, at 17–31. The fifteen areas identified by NHTSA are: (1) 
data recording and sharing, (2) privacy, (3) system safety, (4) vehicle cybersecurity, (5) human ma-
chine interface, (6) crashworthiness, (7) consumer education and training, (8) registration and certifi-
cation, (9) post-crash behavior, (10) federal, state, and local laws, (11) ethical considerations, (12) 
operational design domain, (13) object and event detection and response, (14) fall back (minimal risk 
condition), and (15) validation methods. Id. 
 66 See id. at 15–16 (detailing the process for indicating compliance with the safety assessment 
areas). 
 67 See id. (discussing NHTSA’s expectations for the Safety Assessment Letter). NHTSA also 
requires the Safety Assessment Letter to include, next to each safety assessment area, the name, title, 
and a signature of a company representative “to ensure appropriate transparency, awareness, and over-
sight within the submitting organization.” Id. at 16. 
 68 Id. at 15. 
 69 See AV GUIDANCE 2.0, supra note 24, at 1 (released in September 2017 and replacing AV 
GUIDANCE 1.0); AV GUIDANCE 1.0, supra note 24, at 15 (released in September 2016). 
 70 See AV GUIDANCE 2.0, supra note 24, at 5–15 (listing the safety elements). The twelve safety 
elements are: (1) system safety, (2) operation design domain, (3) object and event detection and re-
sponse, (4) fallback (minimal risk condition), (5) validation methods, (6) human machine interface, 
(7) vehicle cybersecurity, (8) crashworthiness, (9) post-crash ADS behavior, (10) data recording, (11) 
consumer education and training, and (12) federal, state, and local laws. Id. Privacy, registration and 
certification, and ethical considerations—listed as safety assessment areas in AV GUIDANCE 1.0—are 
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changed the name of the Safety Assessment Letter to the Voluntary Safety 
Self-Assessment.71 In contrast to its first guidance document, NHTSA notes 
that, though submissions are welcomed prior to testing on public roads, entities 
need not delay testing in order to submit a Voluntary Safety Self-Assessment.72 
In each Voluntary Safety Self-Assessment, NHTSA encourages entities to indi-
cate whether the “safety element was considered” or whether the “safety ele-
ment is not applicable.”73 
In the third guidance document, which supplements but does not super-
sede the second guidance document, the DOT, NHTSA’s parent department, 
applies the principles detailed in the second guidance document to transporta-
tion automation in different sectors, such as commercial vehicles and commer-
cial carriers that are regulated by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administra-
tion.74 The third guidance document affirms the policy of encouraging entities 
to submit Voluntary Safety Self-Assessments, and also suggests that entities 
make such submissions available to the public.75 
The fourth and most recent guidance document, released by the DOT in 
January 2020, continues to build upon, but does not replace, the principles set 
forth in the second and third guidance documents.76 The fourth guidance doc-
ument attempts to present a uniform federal policy toward automated vehicles 
by compiling actions taken to date by the DOT and other federal agencies and 
detailing the responsibilities of federal agencies outside the DOT and NHTSA 
in the development of automated vehicles.77 The document also affirms the 
                                                                                                                           
not included in the safety elements in AV GUIDANCE 2.0. Id.; AV GUIDANCE 1.0, supra note 24, at 
17–31. 
 71 AV GUIDANCE 2.0, supra note 24, at 16. 
 72 See id. (“Entities are not required to submit a Voluntary Safety Self-Assessment, nor is there 
any mechanism to compel entities to do so. While these assessments are encouraged prior to testing 
and deployment, NHTSA does not require that entities provide submissions nor are they required to 
delay testing or deployment. Assessments are not subject to Federal approval.”). 
 73 Id. The second guidance document also dispensed with the requirement for a signature from a 
company representative for each safety assessment area. See id. (omitting a signature requirement); 
see also supra text accompanying note 67 (discussing the signature requirements in AV GUIDANCE 
1.0). 
 74 AV GUIDANCE 3.0, supra note 2, at viii, x, 27; see also supra text accompanying note 24 (dis-
cussing the iteration of guidance documents). 
 75 AV GUIDANCE 3.0, supra note 2, at 26. NHTSA has released a template for the Voluntary Safety 
Self-Assessment. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., Voluntary Safety Self-Assessment Tem-
plate, https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/documents/voluntary_safety_self-assessment_for_
web_101117_v1.pdf [https://perma.cc/A2CF-TKTE]. For an example of a completed Voluntary Safety 
Self-Assessment, see generally GEN. MOTORS, 2018 SELF-DRIVING SAFETY REPORT, https://www.
gm.com/content/dam/company/docs/us/en/gmcom/gmsafetyreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/WBK6-P6Y5]. 
 76 AV GUIDANCE 4.0, supra note 24, at 1. 
 77 See id. (noting the document “outlines certain past and current Federal efforts, and compiles 
available key resources for innovators and entrepreneurs in the surface transportation AV domain”). 
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DOT and NHTSA’s commitment to voluntary standards and compliance for 
automated vehicles.78 
E. Congressional Action (or Inaction) on Automated Vehicles:  
The SELF DRIVE Act and AV START Act 
With NHTSA’s statutory authority and regulatory tools more aligned with 
human-operated vehicles, the 115th Congress sought to advance legislation 
that balanced the need to test and deploy automated vehicles with public safety 
interests.79 The result was a bill in each chamber of Congress.80 In the House 
of Representatives, Representative Bob Latta introduced H.R. 3388, the SELF 
DRIVE Act, on July 25, 2017.81 In the Senate, Senator John Thune introduced 
S. 1885, the AV START Act, on September 28, 2017.82 In general, both bills 
preempt certain state and local laws, require NHTSA to conduct rulemaking, 
increase the number of vehicles eligible for exemption, and require safety-
related submissions to NHTSA.83 The bills also adopt the SAE terminology 
and definitions and target “highly automated vehicles,” or those vehicles 
equipped with an SAE level 3–5 ADS.84 
The bills contain provisions that preempt certain state and local laws and 
regulations as they relate to automated vehicles, but the preemption provisions 
in the SELF DRIVE Act are broader than those in the AV START Act.85 The 
SELF DRIVE Act preempts all state and local laws and regulations pertaining 
to the “design, construction, or performance” of highly automated vehicles.86 
                                                                                                                           
 78 See id. at 29 (noting, “[t]he U.S. Government will promote voluntary consensus standards as a 
mechanism to encourage increased investment and bring cost-effective innovation to the market more 
quickly”). 
 79 See Press Release, Sen. John Thune, Thune Introduces Bipartisan Autonomous Vehicle Legis-
lation (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.thune.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2017/9/thune-introduces-
bipartisan-autonomous-vehicle-legislation [https://perma.cc/5UPN-TEMT] (discussing the need for 
federal leadership and legislative changes to accommodate automated vehicles). For the status of 
automated vehicle legislation in the current 116th Congress, see infra notes 128–129 and accompany-
ing text. 
 80 See American Vision for Safer Transportation Through Advancement of Revolutionary Tech-
nologies Act, S. 1885, 115th Cong. (2017) (as reported by S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp., 
Nov. 28, 2017) [hereinafter AV START Act] (serving as the Senate legislative vehicle); Safely Ensur-
ing Lives Future Deployment and Research in Vehicle Evolution Act, H.R. 3388, 115th Cong. (2017) 
(as passed by House, Sept. 6, 2017) [hereinafter SELF DRIVE Act] (serving as the House legislative 
vehicle). 
 81 Safely Ensuring Lives Future Deployment and Research In Vehicle Evolution Act, H.R. 3388, 
115th Cong. (2017) (as introduced, July 25, 2017). 
 82 Press Release, supra note 79. 
 83 See AV START Act §§ 3, 4, 6, 9 (preempting certain laws, ordering rulemaking, increasing 
exemptions, and requiring submissions to NHTSA); SELF DRIVE Act §§ 3, 4, 6 (same). 
 84 AV START Act §§ 2, 4, 8; SELF DRIVE Act § 13.  
 85 See AV START Act § 3 (discussing state and local law preemption); SELF DRIVE Act § 3 
(same). 
 86 SELF DRIVE Act § 3. 
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The SELF DRIVE Act also contains a provision stating that, although nothing 
in the bill is to be construed as prohibiting states and localities from legislating 
or regulating in traditional areas—such as registration, safety and emissions 
inspections, and congestion management—these areas can be preempted if 
they act as an “unreasonable restriction on the design, construction, or perfor-
mance of highly automated vehicles.”87 The AV START Act, however, 
preempts only those state and local laws and regulations that fall under nine 
subject areas listed in the bill.88 The nine subject areas are: system safety, data 
recording, cybersecurity, human-machine interface, crashworthiness, capabili-
ties, post-crash behavior, account for applicable laws, and automation func-
tion.89 Thus, state laws or regulations that encroach unreasonably on design, 
construction, or performance—which may be open to a broad interpretation—
could be preempted under the SELF DRIVE Act, whereas the AV START 
Act’s preemption is limited to the subject areas listed above.90 
Both bills also require NHTSA to conduct rulemaking to update FMVSS 
for automated vehicles, but take different approaches to the rulemaking pro-
cess, with the rulemaking in the SELF DRIVE Act having a broader scope.91 
Within one year of enactment, the SELF DRIVE Act requires NHTSA to de-
liver a rulemaking and safety priority plan to “accommodate the development 
and deployment of highly automated vehicles” by updating FMVSS, issuing 
new FMVSS, and considering ranges for performance standards to test 
FMVSS.92 The SELF DRIVE Act requires the first rulemaking process based 
on NHTSA’s priority plan to commence within eighteen months of enact-
ment.93 By contrast, the rulemaking included in the AV START Act is much 
narrower because it only requires references to human drivers in existing 
FMVSS be updated rather than the creation of new FMVSS applicable to au-
tomated vehicles.94 The AV START Act orders the Director of the John A. 
Volpe National Transportation Systems Center of the DOT (“Volpe Center”) to 
review FMVSS for provisions that reference human drivers and then deliver a 
                                                                                                                           
 87 Id. 
 88 AV START Act § 3. 
 89 Id. § 9. 
 90 See id. § 3 (listing subject areas that are preempted); SELF DRIVE Act § 3 (discussing state 
and local law preemption); see also AV GUIDANCE 3.0, supra note 2, at 18 (discussing the role of 
state and local governments in the proliferation of automated vehicles). NHTSA notes that states and 
localities have traditionally played the role of “licensing human drivers, registering motor vehicles, 
enacting and enforcing traffic laws, conducting safety inspections, and regulating motor vehicle insur-
ance and liability” and that states will likely retain these roles with the adoption of automated vehi-
cles. AV GUIDANCE 3.0, supra note 2, at 18. 
 91 See AV START Act § 4 (ordering the commencement of rulemaking); SELF DRIVE Act § 4 
(same). 
 92 SELF DRIVE Act § 4. 
 93 Id. 
 94 See AV START Act § 4 (discussing the scope of rulemaking). 
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report within 180 days of enactment that recommends conforming references 
to an appropriate ADS in lieu of a human driver.95 Within ninety days of the 
Volpe Center report, the AV START Act requires NHTSA to begin a rulemak-
ing process to incorporate the report’s recommendations into FMVSS.96 If 
NHTSA does not complete rulemaking within one year of the Volpe Center 
report’s submission, then the report’s recommendations are automatically incor-
porated into FMVSS.97 Therefore, although the scope of rulemaking in the AV 
START Act is narrower than the SELF DRIVE Act, it provides a faster approach 
to updating FMVSS as it relates to existing references to human drivers.98 
Both the SELF DRIVE Act and AV START Act seek to expand NHTSA’s 
authority to exempt a certain number of automated vehicles from compliance 
with FMVSS.99 The SELF DRIVE Act allows NHTSA to grant exemptions for 
automated vehicles from FMVSS—currently capped at 2,500—at a rate of 
25,000 vehicles in the first twelve-month period following enactment, 50,000 
vehicles within the second twelve-month period, 100,000 vehicles within the 
third twelve-month period, and 100,000 vehicles in the fourth twelve-month 
period.100 The SELF DRIVE Act permits a manufacturer to renew an exemp-
tion, but renewals must not exceed 100,000 vehicles in any twelve-month peri-
od.101 The SELF DRIVE Act also increases the timeframe during which ex-
emptions and renewals are valid from two years to four years.102 The SELF 
DRIVE Act does not allow exemptions from FMVSS for crashworthiness to be 
granted until one year after NHTSA issues a rule requiring a safety assessment 
certification and the rulemaking and safety plan is complete.103 The SELF 
DRIVE Act also requires a manufacturer to submit information to NHTSA if 
                                                                                                                           
 95 Id. The Volpe Center was established within the DOT in 1970 to provide expertise across dis-
ciplines to address complex, multi-modal transportation issues. About Us, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. 
VOLPE CTR., https://www.volpe.dot.gov/about-us [https://perma.cc/UB2Y-NP2H]. The Volpe Center 
already has experience and expertise in analyzing FMVSS as they relate to automated vehicles. See 
KIM ET AL., supra note 53, at ii (performing a review of FMVSS as they relate to automated vehicles). 
 96 AV START Act § 4. 
 97 Id. 
 98 See id. (requiring the rulemaking process to be complete within eighteen months of enactment, 
otherwise the Volpe Center’s recommendations will be incorporated into FMVSS); SELF DRIVE Act 
§ 4 (requiring the rulemaking process to begin no later than eighteen months after enactment). 
 99 AV START Act § 6; SELF DRIVE Act § 6. 
 100 SELF DRIVE Act § 6. 
 101 Id. 
 102 See 49 U.S.C. § 30113 (2012) (establishing the current validity period for exemptions); SELF 
DRIVE Act § 6 (increasing the validity period for exemptions). 
 103 SELF DRIVE Act § 6; see infra notes 111–113 and accompanying text (detailing the safety 
assessment certification). Crashworthiness standards are aimed at protecting the vehicle occupant. 
Crashworthiness, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., https://www.nhtsa.gov/research-data/
crashworthiness [https://perma.cc/3L88-W4NE]. The provision disallowing exemptions for crashwor-
thiness standards does not apply to vehicles that are not designed to carry human occupants. SELF 
DRIVE Act § 6. 
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an exempted vehicle is involved in a crash and requires NHTSA to create a 
public database that includes information for all vehicles issued an exemp-
tion.104 
The AV START Act allows NHTSA to grant exemptions for 15,000 vehi-
cles in the first twelve-month period following enactment, 40,000 vehicles in 
the second twelve-month period, and 80,000 vehicles in the third twelve-
month period and each twelve-month period thereafter.105 If an exemption has 
been in place for four years, a manufacturer can petition NHTSA to expand the 
exemption beyond 80,000 vehicles in a twelve-month period.106 The AV 
START Act requires NHTSA to grant or deny an exemption request within 180 
days and allows for public comment on exemption requests.107 Unlike the 
SELF DRIVE Act, the AV START Act contains a sunset clause that terminates 
a manufacturer’s eligibility for an exemption from FMVSS for automated ve-
hicles either ten years following enactment or on the date NHTSA issues a new 
standard for the exemption sought.108 Both the SELF DRIVE Act and AV 
START Act retain the eligibility requirement that a new safety feature is at 
least as safe as the applicable FMVSS, or the exempted vehicle is at least as 
safe as a non-exempt vehicle overall.109 
Both the SELF DRIVE Act and AV START Act require entities develop-
ing automated vehicles to make safety-related submissions to NHTSA.110 The 
SELF DRIVE Act orders NHTSA, within twenty-four months of enactment, to 
issue a final rule that would outline safety-related areas for entities to address 
when developing automated vehicles.111 The final rule must also contain a re-
quirement that entities submit a safety assessment certification.112 The safety 
assessment certification must include details on how a manufacturer addresses 
the safety areas identified in the final rule.113 NHTSA is not permitted, howev-
er, to “condition deployment or testing of highly automated vehicles on review 
of safety assessment certifications.”114 In the interim period while the rulemak-
                                                                                                                           
 104 SELF DRIVE Act § 6. 
 105 AV START Act § 6. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id.; see SELF DRIVE Act § 6 (lacking a sunset clause). 
 109 See AV START Act § 6 (discussing eligibility for exemptions); SELF DRIVE Act § 6 (same). 
See 49 U.S.C. § 30113 to compare the effect of the amendments in the SELF DRIVE Act and AV 
START Act to the general exemption provisions. 
 110 AV START Act § 9; SELF DRIVE Act § 4. 
 111 SELF DRIVE Act § 4. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. 
2020] Regulation of Self-Driving Cars 311 
ing process is underway, the SELF DRIVE Act requires submission of “safety 
assessment letters” to NHTSA.115 
The AV START Act requires manufacturers to make similar safety-related 
submissions in a safety evaluation report.116 The AV START Act lists nine sub-
ject areas that a safety evaluation report is required to address.117 Each safety 
evaluation report requires a signature by an official representing the submitting 
entity to certify that “based on the official’s knowledge, the report does not 
contain any untrue statement of a material fact.”118 The AV START Act also 
includes a civil penalty for the submission of false or misleading safety evalua-
tion reports.119 The submission of a safety evaluation report to NHTSA is re-
quired upon testing an automated vehicle or not later than ninety days before 
the sale or commercialization of an automated vehicle.120 NHTSA must make 
the safety evaluation report public within sixty days of receipt.121 Similar to the 
SELF DRIVE Act, NHTSA is not permitted to “condition the manufacture, 
testing, sale, offer for sale, or introduction into interstate commerce of a highly 
automated vehicle or automated driving system based on a review of a safety 
evaluation report.”122 
It initially appeared that these pieces of legislation had a strong chance of 
passage in the 115th Congress.123 The SELF DRIVE Act passed the House of 
Representatives on September 6, 2017 by a unanimous voice vote, but stalled 
in the Senate.124 The AV START Act, meanwhile, could not overcome the con-
                                                                                                                           
 115 Id. The SELF DRIVE Act says “safety assessment letters shall be submitted to [NHTSA] as 
contemplated by [AV GUIDANCE 1.0], or any successor guidance issued on highly automated vehicles 
requiring a safety assessment letter.” Id. Because the bill specifically refers to “safety assessment 
letters,” a term used only in AV GUIDANCE 1.0, it is not entirely clear whether this language requires 
safety assessment letters conform to the requirements in AV GUIDANCE 1.0, or whether the Voluntary 
Safety Self-Assessment outlined in AV GUIDANCE 2.0 satisfies this requirement. See id. (requiring 
submission of a safety assessment letter); see also supra text accompanying note 24 (discussing the 
succession of guidance documents and noting that AV GUIDANCE 2.0 supersedes AV GUIDANCE 1.0). 
 116 AV START Act § 9. 
 117 Id. The nine areas are: (1) system safety, (2) data recording, (3) cybersecurity, (4) human-
machine interface, (5) crashworthiness, (6) capabilities, (7) post-crash behavior, (8) account for appli-
cable laws, and (9) automation function. Id. 
 118 Id. 
 119 See id. (adding the submission of a false or misleading safety evaluation report to the civil 
penalties provision in 49 U.S.C. § 30165(a)(4)); see also 49 U.S.C. § 30165(a)(4) (2012 & Supp. V 
2017) (assessing “a civil penalty of not more than $5,000 per day” to “[a] person who knowingly and 
willfully submits materially false or misleading information to the Secretary” of Transportation). 
 120 AV START Act § 9. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id.; see SELF DRIVE Act § 4 (detailing the scope of NHTSA’s authority). 
 123 See Cecilia Kang, Self-Driving Cars’ Prospects Rise with Vote by House, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 
2017, at B4 (discussing prospects for passage). 
 124 Id. 
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cerns of key Senators and was never brought to the floor for a vote.125 Some 
legislators expressed apprehension about allowing unproven vehicles on the 
road with the general public.126 Other observers suggested that instead of clear-
ing the road for new regulations, the SELF DRIVE Act and AV START Act are 
giveaways to the automotive industry that do too much to entrench exemptions 
as a way forward at the expense of rulemaking to create new FMVSS.127 
Currently, in the 116th Congress, the House Energy & Commerce Com-
mittee and the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee are 
engaged in efforts to draft bipartisan automated vehicle legislation acceptable 
to both the Democrat controlled House of Representatives and the Republican 
controlled Senate.128 A draft of potential bill language on certain topics—
including advisory committees, testing, and exemptions—is circulating among 
stakeholders, but it is unclear how the draft compares to the SELF DRIVE Act 
and AV START Act and whether common ground between the House and Sen-
ate will be found.129 
                                                                                                                           
 125 See Sam Mintz, AV START Hits Dead End, POLITICO (Dec. 20, 2018, 10:00 AM), https://www.
politico.com/newsletters/morning-transportation/2018/12/20/av-start-hits-dead-end-461335 [https://perma.
cc/G2XE-2GEY] (noting the bill is dead for the 115th Congress); Tony Romm, A Bill to Put More Self-
Driving Cars on U.S. Roads Is Stuck in the Senate, RECODE (Jan. 18, 2018, 1:59 PM), https://www.
recode.net/2018/1/18/16905964/self-driving-car-testing-roads-congress-senate [https://perma.cc/5JXA-
G4K3] (describing disagreements among Senators).  
126 See Shaun Courtney, Senate Won’t Vote on Self-Driving Car Bill in 2017: Thune, BLOOM-
BERG BNA (Dec. 20, 2017), https://bit.ly/2Rmv65G [https://perma.cc/3WDF-9HS9] (noting that, as 
the Senate’s legislative calendar for 2017 came to an end, Senator Dianne Feinstein remained opposed 
to the bill). Senator Feinstein was quoted as saying “I’m strongly opposed to it . . . . I do not want 
untested autonomous vehicles on the freeways which are complicated, move fast and are loaded with 
huge trucks.” Id. 
 127 Joan Claybrook, Don’t Let Congress Put Dangerous Self-Driving Cars on the Road at the 
Cost of Human Lives, USA TODAY (Aug, 7, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/
opinion/2018/08/07/congress-wants-accelerate-deadly-self-driving-car-technology-column/891085
002/ [https://perma.cc/NZ2U-GSD3] (advocating against passage of the AV START Act). The author, 
a safety advocate and former NHTSA Administrator, wrote:  
I call on all U.S. senators to oppose the AV START Act unless vital improvements are 
added, such as eliminating massive exemptions from federal safety standards . . . . The 
legislation is not just a first step to regulating self-driving vehicles as its proponents 
claim. In fact, it deregulates safety for these vehicles. If this bill passes, the auto indus-
try will fight to the death to prevent new legislation requiring commonsense safety 
rules. 
Id. 
 128 Greg Rogers, Congress Drafts First Sections of New, Bipartisan Autonomous Vehicle Bill, 
FORBES (Oct. 30, 2019, 11:53 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/gregrogers1/2019/10/30/congress-
drafts-first-sections-of-new-bipartisan-autonomous-vehicle-bill/#1232f3c21043 [https://perma.cc/
CFZ4-X32X]. 
 129 See id. (“House and Senate committee staff circulated draft legislative text for three sections of 
the bill that addressed federal advisory committees, AV testing expansions, and exemptions to allow 
for vehicles with novel designs. In an email to stakeholders, staff emphasized that this is just the first 
tranche of text, indicating more sections are soon to follow.”). Compare Cat Zakrzewski, The Tech-
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II. THE BALANCING TEST: PROMOTING INNOVATION  
AND ENSURING PUBLIC SAFETY 
All regulatory schemes impose costs on the regulated entity or party.130 
From a policymaking perspective, the question of how, and at what stage of 
development, to regulate automated vehicles boils down to whether the poten-
tial costs of more regulation outweigh the benefits of the status quo, or even 
deregulation.131 With the tremendous potential of automated vehicles, policy-
makers and regulators must balance the need for flexibility in research and de-
velopment with the inherent growing pains and dangers that accompany the 
development of a machine so complex.132 Unlike research done in a laboratory, 
automated vehicles are undergoing testing on public roads in ways that have 
the potential to cause property damage or personal injury.133 
Policymakers and regulators are confronted with two objectives that, at 
times, conflict with one another: (1) promote the testing and deployment of 
automated vehicles, and (2) ensure public safely.134 This Part discusses these 
objectives, applies them to NHTSA’s current regulatory tools and proposals in 
Congress, and gives an overview of an alternative regulatory regime used for 
                                                                                                                           
nology 202: Self-Driving Car Companies at CES Say: Safety First, WASH. POST (Jan. 9, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/the-technology-202/2019/01/09/the-tech-
nology-202-self-driving-car-companies-at-ces-say-safety-first/5c34e4261b326b66fc5a1be1/?no
redirect=on&utm_term=.eeef1bee88ab [https://perma.cc/Y4NK-YTVE] (discussing prospects for 
automated vehicle legislation and noting that Rep. Jan Schakowsky, a co-sponsor of the SELF DRIVE 
Act, said the AV START Act “fell woefully short.”), with Courtney, supra note 126 (noting that Sena-
tor John Thune, a co-sponsor of the AV START Act, estimated that the AV START Act could garner 
70–75 votes in favor of passage in the Senate in the new Congress). 
 130 See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, 2017 DRAFT REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND 
COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND AGENCY COMPLIANCE WITH THE UNFUNDED MANDATES 
REFORM ACT 2 (2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/draft_2017_cost_
benefit_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/F392-YTWE] (estimating the annual cost of major federal regula-
tions as “between $78 and $115 billion”). Of course, regulations can also have benefits as well. See id. 
(estimating the annual benefits of major federal regulations as ranging from $287 to $911 billion). 
 131 See AV GUIDANCE 3.0, supra note 2, at 19 (discussing regulatory choices facing states and 
noting, “[s]tates should consider reviewing and potentially modifying traffic laws and regulations that 
may be barriers to automated vehicles. For example, several States have following distance laws that 
prohibit trucks from following too closely to each other, effectively prohibiting automated truck pla-
tooning applications”). 
 132 See Alejandro Lazo, Arizona, Site of Deadly Uber Crash, Pushed to Become Nation’s Test 
Lab for Driverless Cars, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 20, 2018, 10:33 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
arizona-site-of-deadly-uber-crash-pushed-to-become-nations-test-lab-for-driverless-cars-1521569259 
[https://perma.cc/Y9SZ-2C8T] (discussing a fatality that arose during Arizona’s campaign to become 
a testing ground for automated vehicles). 
 133 See Wakabayashi, supra note 5 (describing a fatality in Arizona caused by an automated vehi-
cle undergoing testing). 
 134 See AV GUIDANCE 3.0, supra note 2, at iv (noting “U.S. DOT will lead efforts to address 
potential safety risks and advance the life-saving potential of automation,” and declaring “[w]henever 
possible, the Department will support the development of voluntary, consensus-based technical stand-
ards and approaches that are flexible and adaptable over time”). 
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the certification of aircraft.135 Section A discusses the goal of encouraging au-
tomated vehicles and maximizing innovation.136 Section B contrasts that goal 
with the objective of ensuring public safety.137 Section C analyzes the objectives 
in relation to NHTSA’s current regulatory tools.138 Section D explores whether 
the SELF DRIVE Act and AV START Act strike a balance between the objec-
tives.139 Section E details the regulatory framework, known as type approval, 
used by the FAA to permit innovation while ensuring public safety.140 
A. Objective One: Maximize Innovation 
The development of automated vehicles promises to bring both economic 
benefits and broader societal benefits.141 At the forefront of potential societal 
benefits is a reduction in the amount of traffic fatalities.142 There were 37,133 
fatalities on U.S. roadways in 2017, and approximately 1.35 million fatalities 
worldwide.143 The introduction of automated vehicles in the United States can 
potentially cause traffic fatalities to fall from the second leading cause of death 
to the ninth leading cause of death and reduce the costs associated with traffic 
accidents by up to $190 billion each year.144 
Moreover, automated vehicles may enhance mobility for disabled and el-
derly individuals.145 The need for paratransit, or transportation for disabled 
                                                                                                                           
 135 See infra notes 130–285 and accompanying text. 
 136 See infra notes 141–163 and accompanying text. 
 137 See infra notes 164–184 and accompanying text. 
 138 See infra notes 185–223 and accompanying text. 
 139 See infra notes 224–258 and accompanying text. 
 140 See infra notes 259–285 and accompanying text. 
 141 See AV GUIDANCE 3.0, supra note 2, at ii (describing automated vehicles as having the poten-
tial to enhance productivity, increase mobility, reduce crashes due to human error, and decrease motor 
vehicle fatality rates); Michele Bertoncello & Dominik Wee, Ten Ways Autonomous Driving Could 
Redefine the Automotive World, MCKINSEY & CO. (June 2015), https://www.mckinsey.com/
industries/automotive-and-assembly/our-insights/ten-ways-autonomous-driving-could-redefine-the-
automotive-world [https://perma.cc/83K6-FPVS] (discussing benefits from increases in productivity 
and healthcare savings resulting from a decrease in motor vehicle injuries and fatalities). 
 142 See Bertoncello & Wee, supra note 141 (discussing the potential decline in motor vehicle 
fatalities and resulting benefits). 
 143 AV GUIDANCE 3.0, supra note 2, at 1 (U.S. statistics); Road Traffic Injuries, WORLD HEALTH 
ORG. (Dec. 7, 2018), https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/road-traffic-injuries [https://
perma.cc/GDA5-39Q6] (worldwide statistics). Worldwide, there are approximately 20–50 million 
non-fatal injuries per year caused by motor vehicle accidents. Road Traffic Injuries, supra. 
 144 See Bertoncello & Wee, supra note 141 (looking toward a scenario in 2050 where automated 
vehicles are widely adopted and discussing the health care savings accompanying a reduction in traffic 
accidents and fatalities). “The overall annual cost of roadway crashes to the US economy was $212 
billion in 2012. Taking that year as an example, advanced [ADS] and [automated vehicles] reducing 
accidents by up to 90 percent would have potentially saved about $190 billion.” Id. 
 145 See Kate Baggaley, 6 Surprising Ways Driverless Cars Will Change Our World, NBC NEWS 
(Apr. 18, 2018, 2:11 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/mach/science/6-surprising-ways-driverless-cars-
will-change-our-world-ncna867061 [https://perma.cc/8A4F-5YVK] (discussing the potential for en-
hanced mobility for disabled and aged individuals). 
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individuals who cannot drive on their own, has continued to grow, even though 
the geographic reach of such services is constrained.146 Automated vehicles 
could reduce labor costs associated with paratransit and mobility services for 
the elderly, while also expanding the geographic reach of such services in ways 
that provide enhanced mobility and independence.147 
Widespread adoption of automated vehicles could also lead to significant 
economic benefits from the compound effects of changes in vehicle ownership, 
emissions, parking, housing, and productivity.148 For example, individual vehi-
cle ownership may fall out of favor with the rise of on-demand fleets of SAE 
level 4 automated vehicles that can provide point-to-point transportation.149 
Instead of owning a vehicle, an individual might purchase a subscription from 
an automated vehicle ridesharing operator for a predetermined number of rides 
or may pay on a ride-by-ride basis.150 While an individually owned vehicle 
currently spends approximately ninety-five percent of its time parked, auto-
mated vehicles operating in an on-demand ridesharing network would only 
need to park in periods of low demand or for maintenance, refueling, and 
cleaning.151 Consequently, the current space devoted to parking could be freed 
up significantly if individual car ownership is replaced by ridesharing.152 
                                                                                                                           
 146 See Srikanth Saripalli, Are Self-Driving Cars the Future of Mobility for Disabled People?, 
THE CONVERSATION (Oct. 5, 2017, 8:55 PM), https://theconversation.com/are-self-driving-cars-the-
future-of-mobility-for-disabled-people-84037 [https://perma.cc/X5PS-SHUN] (detailing obstacles 
disabled individuals encounter when accessing mobility). 
 147 See Baggaley, supra note 145 (discussing the potential benefits of automated vehicles for 
elderly and disabled individuals); Saripalli, supra note 146 (discussing the potential benefits of auto-
mated vehicles for disabled individuals). 
 148 See Baggaley, supra note 145 (discussing changes that could accompany wide adoption of 
automated vehicles); Bertoncello & Wee, supra note 141 (same); Dan Perry, The Societal Impact of 
Self-Driving Cars, MEDIUM (Nov. 27, 2017), https://medium.com/our-future/the-societal-impact-of-
self-driving-cars-364644193a8a [https://perma.cc/6CGP-KCUJ?type=image] (same). 
 149 See Perry, supra note 148 (noting that expenses attributed to car ownership may be diverted to 
business models for automated vehicles that do not involve individual ownership). 
 150 See id. (describing a move away from individual car ownership). With U.S. auto loan balances of 
approximately $1.27 trillion, a reduction in debt associated with car ownership could also lead to in-
creased spending power for consumers. See Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Total Household 
Debt Rises as 2018 Marks the Ninth Year of Annual Growth in New Auto Loans (Feb. 12, 2019), 
https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/research/2019/20190212 [https://perma.cc/SE5Y-E9CA] 
(noting that auto loan debt at the end of the fourth quarter of 2018 was $1.27 trillion). 
 151 See David Z. Morris, Today’s Cars Are Parked 95% of the Time, FORTUNE (Mar. 13, 2016), 
http://fortune.com/2016/03/13/cars-parked-95-percent-of-time/ [https://perma.cc/4XKA-DF6P] (not-
ing the time vehicles currently spend parked and the resulting benefits if automated vehicles free up 
parking spaces). 
 152 See Bertoncello & Wee, supra note 141 (estimating that automated vehicles could liberate more 
than 5.7 billion square meters of space currently used for parking). Some urban planners observe that 
“because driverless vehicles will drop off passengers and move on, prime real estate now consumed by 
vast parking lots and unsightly garages could be freed up for more housing, parks, public plazas and open 
space . . . .” Katherine Shaver, City Planners Eye Self-Driving Vehicles to Correct Mistakes of the 20th-
Century Auto, WASH. POST (July 20, 2019, 10:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
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The proliferation of automated vehicles available on-demand may also re-
sult in an exodus from the cities.153 With the mind-numbing tedium of a hectic 
commute replaced by the comfort of being chauffeured to and from work in an 
automated vehicle, individuals might choose to lower their cost of living by 
settling further away from areas with high costs of living.154 Moreover, during 
their commutes, individuals could be freed from focusing their attention on the 
roadway and use their time more productively.155 Nevertheless, de-
urbanization due to automated vehicles may also have detrimental impacts, 
such as increased pollution and congestion.156 
As a result of the potential societal and economic benefits of automated 
vehicles, policymakers and regulators are hesitant to erect regulatory road-
blocks that may impede their development.157 For some policymakers and reg-
ulators, maximizing innovation has become a primary objective.158 Uber’s de-
cision to transition its automated vehicle testing operations from California to 
Arizona may be the best example of this phenomenon.159 Uber was unwilling 
                                                                                                                           
transportation/2019/07/20/city-planners-eye-self-driving-vehicles-correct-mistakes-th-century-auto/ 
[https://perma.cc/9CA9-J4UY]. 
 153 See Perry, supra note 148 (noting automated vehicles may lead to a reduction in urbanization). 
 154 See id. (discussing the convenience and reduction in commute times that may accompany 
automated vehicles). 
 155 See Bertoncello & Wee, supra note 141 (estimating that automated vehicles “could free as 
much as 50 minutes a day for users, who will be able to spend traveling time working, relaxing, or 
accessing entertainment”). 
 156 See Shaver, supra note 152 (“[S]ome say driverless vehicles could also worsen [congestion 
and pollution], particularly if they’re priced affordably enough to make them wildly popular and en-
courage solo driving. Another concern is the potential for what some planners have dubbed ‘sprawl on 
steroids.’ A two-hour commute becomes less onerous if travelers can nap, watch a movie or hold a 
business meeting rather than fume behind the wheel.”). 
 157 See AV GUIDANCE 3.0, supra note 2, at viii (“Automation technologies are new and rapidly 
evolving. The right approach to achieving safety improvements begins with a focus on removing un-
necessary barriers and issuing voluntary guidance, rather than regulations that could stifle innova-
tion.”). 
 158 See Ariz. Exec. Order No. 2015-09, (Aug. 25, 2015), https://azgovernor.gov/file/2660/down
load?token=nLkPLRi1 [https://perma.cc/WZ5V-7CTX] (declaring Arizona “believes that develop-
ment of self-driving vehicle technology will promote economic growth, bring new jobs, provide re-
search opportunities for the State’s academic institutions and their students and faculty, and allow the 
State to host the emergence of new technologies” and that “the State has the view that the testing and 
operation of self-driving vehicles could produce transformational social benefits such as . . . a dra-
matic increase in pedestrian and passenger safety”); AV GUIDANCE 3.0, supra note 2, at viii (discuss-
ing the correct approach to safety as eliminating impediments to automated vehicles). 
 159 See Dara Kerr, Uber Snubs California, Moves Self-Driving Cars to Arizona, CNET (Dec. 22, 
2016, 4:20 PM) [hereinafter Kerr, Uber Snubs California], https://www.cnet.com/news/uber-snubs-
california-moves-its-self-driving-cars-to-arizona/ [https://perma.cc/M4P4-2CB7] (detailing why Uber 
moved its automated vehicle testing operation to California). California law requires a testing permit, 
issued by the California Department of Motor Vehicles, to test automated vehicles on public roads. 
See CAL. VEH. CODE § 38750 (West 2017) (listing requirements for the application and approval 
process). Instead of applying for a permit, Uber began testing its automated vehicles on public roads 
in California, believing that it did not need a permit. Kerr, Uber Snubs California, supra; see Dara 
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to apply for an automated vehicle-testing permit in California and subsequent-
ly shifted its automated vehicle-testing program to Arizona, where the compa-
ny was met with a warm reception by Governor Doug Ducey.160 In contrast to 
California’s comprehensive regulatory scheme for testing automated vehi-
cles—that requires an application for testing be approved and testing data to be 
reported to the California Department of Motor Vehicles—Arizona has taken a 
more hands off approach to testing within its boundaries.161 To test an auto-
mated vehicle in Arizona the state only requires that: (1) the vehicle be operat-
ed by an employee, contractor, or designee of the developer, (2) the operator 
seated in the vehicle have a valid driver’s license, (3) the operator is able to 
take manual control of the vehicle when necessary, and (4) the developer sub-
mit proof of financial responsibility.162 Policies that promote innovation, how-
ever, sometimes conflict with ensuring public safety.163 
B. Objective Two: Ensure Public Safety 
Although automated vehicles hold the promise of enhancing safety by re-
ducing traffic accidents, they also pose new threats to the public.164 These risks 
arise as a result of a number of issues, including unrefined technology, equip-
ment malfunctions and failures, human error, and public opinion.165 Automated 
                                                                                                                           
Kerr, Uber: We Don’t Need a Permit for Self-Driving Cars, CNET (Dec. 14, 2016, 8:43 PM), https://
www.cnet.com/news/uber-we-dont-need-a-permit-for-self-driving-cars/ [https://perma.cc/C72T-BCGS] 
(discussing Uber’s reasoning in declining to apply for a permit and the California Department of Mo-
tor Vehicles’ position). After attempts to encourage Uber to apply for a permit failed, the California 
Department of Motor Vehicles revoked the registrations of Uber’s test vehicles, effectively ending the 
company’s ability to operate automated vehicles on public roads in California. Kerr, Uber Snubs Cali-
fornia, supra. 
 160 Kerr, Uber Snubs California, supra note 159; Press Release, Gov. Doug Ducey, Governor 
Ducey Tells Uber ‘CA May Not Want You, But AZ Does’ (Dec. 22, 2016), https://azgovernor.gov/
governor/news/2016/12/governor-ducey-tells-uber-ca-may-not-want-you-az-does [https://perma.cc/
S9VU-42TK] (“Arizona welcomes Uber self-driving cars with open arms and wide open roads. While 
California puts the brakes on innovation and change with more bureaucracy and more regulation, 
Arizona is paving the way for new technology and new businesses. In 2015, I signed an executive 
order supporting the testing and operation of self-driving cars in Arizona with an emphasis on innova-
tion, economic growth, and most importantly, public safety. This is about economic development, but 
it’s also about changing the way we live and work. Arizona is proud to be open for business. Califor-
nia may not want you, but we do.”). 
 161 Compare CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, § 227.00–.54 (2019) (detailing the process and require-
ments for obtaining an automated vehicle testing permit in California), with Ariz. Exec. Order No. 
2015-09, supra note 158 (listing four requirements for testing automated vehicles in Arizona). 
 162 Ariz. Exec. Order No. 2015-09, supra note 158. 
 163 See Scott Neuman, Arizona Governor Helped Make State ‘Wild West’ for Driverless Cars, 
NPR (Mar. 20, 2018 4:18 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/03/20/595115055/
arizona-governor-helped-make-state-wild-west-for-driverless-cars [https://perma.cc/LN6N-WLWP] 
(noting criticisms from safety advocates aimed at Arizona’s approach to regulating automated vehicles). 
 164 See AV GUIDANCE 3.0, supra note 2, at iv (noting “new safety risks” that may arise with the 
proliferation of automated vehicles). 
 165 See id. (predicting fresh threats to safety may originate from automated vehicles). 
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vehicles must be able to function safely in extraordinarily complex environ-
ments where they encounter and interact with human operated vehicles, pedes-
trians, and other obstacles.166 This level of safety requires a large amount of 
real world testing on public roads in order to ensure automated vehicles are 
ready for widespread deployment.167 During the testing phase, policymakers, 
regulators, and developers need to assure the public that testing conducted on 
public roads is safe.168 
Similarly, when automated vehicles are ready to deploy and be used by 
the public, policymakers and regulators need to assure users that the vehicles 
are safe.169 Yet difficult questions arise with respect to approximately how safe 
automated vehicles need to be before they are deployed.170 For example, if the 
safety level of a hypothetical automated vehicle is judged to be ten percent 
better than a vehicle operated by an average human driver, is that an acceptable 
level of risk to deploy the automated vehicle?171 This hypothetical automated 
vehicle, if substituted for all human operated vehicles, would still injure and 
kill a large number of humans.172 The notion of automated vehicles causing 
injury or death may not be palatable to either the public or policymakers even 
if overall injuries and fatalities would be less than they would have been in a 
                                                                                                                           
 166 See Jesse Duneitz, To Make Autonomous Vehicles Safe, We Have to Rethink “Autonomous” 
and “Safe,” SCIENTIFIC AM. (Apr. 24, 2018), https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/to-
make-autonomous-vehicles-safe-we-have-to-rethink-autonomous-and-safe/ [https://perma.cc/U4CW-
5TBQ] (discussing the multitude of scenarios than an automated vehicle must be programmed to de-
tect and process). 
 167 NIDHI KALRA & SUSAN M. PADDOCK, RAND CORP., DRIVING TO SAFETY: HOW MANY 
MILES OF DRIVING WOULD IT TAKE TO DEMONSTRATE AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE RELIABILITY? 1 
(2016), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1478.html [https://perma.cc/DDB2-HZP9] 
(observing that automated “vehicles would have to be driven hundreds of millions of miles and some-
times hundreds of billions of miles to demonstrate their reliability in terms of fatalities and injuries”). 
 168 See AV GUIDANCE 3.0, supra note 2, at 36 (explaining “[c]ollaboration is needed among 
manufacturers, technology developers, infrastructure owners and operators, and relevant government 
agencies to establish protocols that will help to advance safe operations in these testing environ-
ments”). 
 169 See id. at 26 (noting that Voluntary Safety Self Assessments provided to NHTSA are “intend-
ed to demonstrate to the public that entities are: considering the safety aspects of an ADS . . . and 
building public trust, acceptance, and confidence through transparent testing and deployment of 
ADS”). 
 170 See NIDHI KALRA & DAVID G. GROVES, RAND CORP., THE ENEMY OF GOOD: ESTIMATING 
THE COST OF WAITING FOR PERFECT AUTOMATED VEHICLES, at ix (2017), https://www.
rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2150.html [https://perma.cc/5BNC-3VXX] (observing that the 
degree to which an automated vehicle needs to be safer than the average human driver may have large 
repercussions). 
 171 See id. at ix–x (discussing findings that suggest widely adopting automated vehicles that are 
10% safer than the average human driver would save more lives in the short run and long run than 
waiting for automated vehicles that are 75% or 90% safer than the average human driver). 
 172 Id. at ix (observing that an automated vehicle that is marginally safer than the average human 
driver would still cause many crashes). 
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status quo scenario of purely human operated vehicles.173 Other ethical issues 
also exist, such as whether automated vehicles need to be programmed with 
the ability to make moral decisions.174 
The choices policymakers and regulators make regarding the balance be-
tween innovation and public safety may have already had real world conse-
quences, as illustrated by Elaine Herzberg’s death in Arizona.175 Some cast 
blame for the accident on the state’s relaxed approach to regulating automated 
vehicle testing.176 In response to criticism over his state’s approach, Governor 
Ducey noted that the overall potential of reducing traffic fatalities with auto-
mated vehicles should not be forgotten.177 This accident nevertheless high-
lights the tightrope that policymakers and regulators must walk in balancing 
innovation and public safety.178 
Public opinion is another critical area of which policymakers and regula-
tors must be cognizant when considering options to satisfy the public safety 
objective of automated vehicle regulation.179 For example, if fatalities such as 
the one resulting from the Uber accident in Arizona were to occur on a regular 
basis, public opinion might turn quickly against automated vehicles and the 
                                                                                                                           
 173 See id. (noting that even if fatality rates are lower than human operated vehicles, “[t]his may 
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policymakers and regulators who reject increased regulation.180 Perversely, 
such a scenario may actually lead to more fatalities through the delayed intro-
duction of automated vehicles that are safer than the average human driver.181 
This risk is not unfounded, as one survey following the Uber accident in Ari-
zona indicated that 73% of those surveyed were “afraid to ride” in an automat-
ed vehicle and 63% said they would “feel less safe sharing the road” with au-
tomated vehicles.182 As a result, policymakers and regulators may need to look 
for solutions that build public trust and ward off the detrimental effects of a 
backlash in public opinion.183 Such solutions could ensure that deployment of 
lifesaving technologies in the form of automated vehicles is not delayed.184 
C. Whether NHTSA Has the Tools to Achieve the Objectives 
Although NHTSA was created to regulate motor vehicles operated by 
humans, it still has tools at its disposal to regulate automated vehicles.185 First, 
NHTSA’s ability to conduct rulemaking to write new FMVSS for automated 
vehicles is clear.186 Because the process for writing new FMVSS requires ex-
tensive research, rulemaking may achieve the public safety objective by setting 
minimum safety requirements that are grounded in hard data.187 Moreover, the 
public comment process that accompanies rulemaking may reduce skepticism 
surrounding automated vehicles.188 Rulemaking may also create more certainty 
for automated vehicle developers by stating specific standards that vehicles 
must meet to be considered roadworthy.189 
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Rulemaking, however, is a slow and deliberate process that may take years 
to complete.190 With the rapid iterative testing and development of automated 
vehicles, future inventions and technical solutions could make proposed FMVSS 
obsolete before they are even adopted.191 Further, with all the technical know-
how and data housed in the private entities developing the technology, it is not 
clear that NHTSA currently has the necessary expertise to develop FMVSS for 
automated vehicles.192 Consequently, rulemaking risks creating barriers to inno-
vation in the form of a process guided by uninformed regulators and the creation 
of new FMVSS that are not tailored to keep up with evolving technology.193 
Another tool available to NHTSA is its ability to grant temporary exemp-
tions from FMVSS in response to petitions from developers.194 Exemptions 
can allow a developer to sidestep FMVSS that were clearly developed with 
human drivers in mind.195 As a result, NHTSA’s exemption authority could be 
a valuable tool to clear the way for innovation.196 Nevertheless, because ex-
emptions only pertain to current FMVSS, the scope of NHTSA’s authority is 
limited.197 Thus, although exemptions are a possible way around antiquated 
FMVSS, they do not provide a mechanism to further regulate the safety of ex-
empted automated vehicles.198 
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Moreover, NHTSA’s statutory authority to issue two-year exemptions 
from FMVSS is currently capped at 2,500 vehicles.199 On the one hand, these 
requirements impose a volume and temporal ceiling that could arbitrarily in-
hibit the proliferation of automated vehicles and any corresponding economic 
and societal benefits.200 On the other hand, these limitations may serve as a 
mechanism that protects public safety by limiting the introduction of exempted 
automated vehicles until more is known about their performance and overall 
safety.201 
NHTSA is further limited because it may only grant exemptions for new 
safety features with a safety level at least equal to the applicable FMVSS or if 
the exempted vehicle is as safe as an existing non-exempt vehicle overall.202 
This standard may prove difficult for developers to meet because FMVSS were 
not written for automated vehicles and non-exempt vehicles are likely to still be 
human operated.203 Thus, an equivalent safety level may be difficult to deter-
mine in the historical context of exemptions issued by NHTSA for vehicle sys-
tems designed to be operated by human drivers.204 Although exemptions might 
still prove useful, they may not be granted at the speed necessary to keep up with 
innovative designs for automated vehicles.205 Furthermore, at least historically, 
NHTSA has received few petitions for exemption for new safety technologies.206 
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NHTSA also has the ability to issue interpretation letters in response to 
requests for interpretations of FMVSS.207 Interpretation letters are typically 
more narrow agency actions than exemptions from FMVSS.208 For example, 
Google submitted an interpretation request to NHTSA for a determination of 
whether an ADS could be deemed the “driver” and therefore allow its vehicle 
to be in compliance with various FMVSS.209 NHTSA agreed that the ADS 
could be deemed the “driver” with respect to certain FMVSS but cautioned 
that Google might not be able to certify compliance with FMVSS that were 
“developed and designed to apply to a vehicle with a human driver.”210 
NHTSA noted that Google may need to instead petition for exemptions or 
rulemaking.211 As a result, although interpretation requests may provide auto-
mated vehicle developers an opportunity to bypass some FMVSS, they may 
not be a panacea to make use of innovative designs in a timely manner.212 
NHTSA has also issued a series of guidance documents that give a sense of 
the agency’s priorities and create a process for entities testing or deploying au-
tomated vehicles to submit information via a Voluntary Safety Self-
Assessment.213 Adherence to the principles in the guidance is voluntary, and thus 
the documents exemplify NHTSA’s “flexible” approach to regulating automated 
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vehicles.214 The submissions of Voluntary Safety Self-Assessments are meant to 
augment this flexible approach by providing information to the agency and the 
public.215 Because compliance is optional, NHTSA is not creating requirements 
for technologies that have not yet matured.216 Further, by not requesting submis-
sion of a Voluntary Safety Self-Assessment prior to testing or deployment, 
NHTSA eases the introduction of automated vehicles onto public roads by elim-
inating the possibility of compliance-related delay.217 Moreover, asking that Vol-
untary Safety Self-Assessments contain only “concise information” related to the 
developer’s use of the guidance relieves the burden of providing complex infor-
mation about the inner workings of the automated vehicles.218 
The optionality of the guidance and the Voluntary Safety Self-Assessment, 
however, does little to ensure that automated vehicle developers will actually 
adhere to the guidance or make submissions, as evidenced by the disparity be-
tween the number of entities approved for testing in California and the number 
of Voluntary Safety Self-Assessments submitted to NHTSA.219 If entities do not 
submit the Voluntary Safety Self-Assessment, then both NHTSA and the public 
are in the dark about who is testing automated vehicles, what the capability of 
the automated vehicles are, and what safety precautions are being taken.220 
Likewise, the generality of the instructions for the content of the Voluntary Safe-
ty Self-Assessment, coupled with the call for only “concise information,” may 
result in submissions that do not provide the kind of data that NHTSA or the 
public need to make an informed opinion about the safety of the technology.221 
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Thus, it is not at all clear that NHTSA’s optional guidance and Voluntary Safety 
Self-Assessment can keep the public safe or guard the technology against a 
backlash in public opinion.222 The Voluntary Safety Self-Assessment lays bare 
the conflict that can occur in attempting to further one objective—maximizing 
innovation—at the expense of another—public safety.223 
D. Whether the SELF DRIVE Act and AV START Act  
Achieve the Objectives 
Both the SELF DRIVE Act and AV START Act were introduced to re-
move impediments for automated vehicles and safeguard the public.224 The 
bills broadly attempt to achieve this goal by preempting certain state laws, or-
dering NHTSA to conduct rulemaking, increasing the number of exemptions 
available to manufacturers, and requiring certain submissions to NHTSA.225 
First, the bills preempt state laws that impinge on the “design, construc-
tion, or performance” of automated vehicles.226 Although the preemption pro-
visions in the SELF DRIVE Act are slightly broader than the preemption pro-
visions in the AV START Act, both bills appear to be aimed at heading off a 
rush of state-level legislation that has arisen in lieu of congressional action.227 
With NHTSA as the country’s chief motor vehicle safety regulator, it could 
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make sense to ensure that a patchwork of differing standards for automated 
vehicles does not develop at the state level.228 Alleviating the specter of state-
by-state regulation may also support innovation by allowing for a single na-
tional compliance framework that gives developers more certainty and might 
not compromise public safety, so long as NHTSA develops a robust framework 
to replace existing state level oversight.229 
Second, both bills require NHTSA to conduct rulemaking to update 
FMVSS.230 The rulemaking process required by the SELF DRIVE Act is broad 
in scope because it requires the creation of new FMVSS.231 Rulemaking would 
not begin until between twelve and eighteen months after enactment, and the 
process itself could take five years or more to complete.232 The AV START 
Act’s rulemaking scope is narrower because it only requires an update to exist-
ing FMVSS.233 It requires the Volpe Center to review FMVSS for references to 
human drivers and create a report within 180 days of enactment.234 Rulemak-
ing is required to begin within ninety days thereafter.235 If the rulemaking is 
not complete within one year of the Volpe Center report’s submission, then the 
report’s recommendations are automatically incorporated into revised 
FMVSS.236 Thus, although the AV START Act’s rulemaking process is likely 
to be significantly faster, its scope is also narrower.237 
The results for each approach appear to be mixed in relation to the objec-
tives.238 The SELF DRIVE Act orders a rulemaking that has the potential to 
create new FMVSS for automated vehicles that, if premature, may hinder in-
novation.239 At the same time, this approach to rulemaking could lead to more 
certainty for those concerned about public safety and for manufacturers who 
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would have on point FMVSS to engineer their vehicles to meet.240 The SELF 
DRIVE Act runs the risk, however, that the standards will already be outdated 
by the time the rulemaking is complete due to advances in technology.241 The 
AV START Act’s rulemaking, meanwhile, is limited to only correcting and 
conforming references in existing FMVSS related to human drivers and thus is 
faster with a lighter touch than the SELF DRIVE Act’s approach.242 The 
downside, however, is that the AV START Act does not result in the public 
safety assurances that rulemaking of a broader scope might create.243 
Third, both bills modify the exemption process and raise the number of 
vehicles that a manufacturer may petition for an exemption.244 By raising the 
cap on exempted vehicles from the current ceiling of 2,500, the SELF DRIVE 
Act and AV START Act allow for the proliferation of tens of thousands more 
exempted vehicles on the roadways than current law.245 This has the potential 
to greatly increase the rate of automated vehicle testing.246 Conversely, merely 
exempting more vehicles from FMVSS that stand in the way of certain auto-
mated vehicle designs does not guarantee, without new standards, that the ex-
empted automated vehicles can safely navigate the roadways.247 Both bills, 
however, preserve the requirement that either a new safety feature must be at 
least as safe as the applicable FMVSS or the overall vehicle must have a safety 
level equivalent to that of a non-exempt vehicle.248 A manufacturer may have 
difficulty satisfying this requirement because it is not clear how NHTSA will 
measure an equivalent level of safety and what data NHTSA would require for 
such a finding.249 Thus, although exemptions may serve as a helpful interim 
step for the testing and deployment of automated vehicles, they may not be 
successful in ensuring public safety.250 
Fourth, both bills require automated vehicle developers to submit infor-
mation to NHTSA, similar to the information NHTSA requested in the Volun-
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 247 See FRAADE-BLANAR & KALRA, supra note 198, at 4 (noting that current FMVSS were not 
written for automated vehicles). 
 248 See AV START Act § 6 (discussing exemptions); SELF DRIVE Act § 6 (listing requirements 
for an exemption). The AV START Act preserves the current requirements for an exemption. AV 
START Act § 6; see also 49 U.S.C. § 30113 (2012) (listing current requirements for an exemption). 
 249 See FRAADE-BLANAR & KALRA, supra note 198, at 4 (discussing the difficulties in judging 
equivalent safety). 
 250 See UNDERSTANDING NHTSA’S REGULATORY TOOLS, supra note 50, at 3 (noting the limited 
scope of exemptions). 
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tary Safety Self-Assessment.251 The SELF DRIVE Act’s safety assessment 
certification gives NHTSA latitude in conducting a rulemaking to determine 
what the submission should include.252 The AV START Act takes a different 
approach by laying out the various subject areas that a safety evaluation report 
must address.253 The AV START Act also includes provisions addressed at ac-
countability, such as requiring a signature from a representative of the submit-
ting entity and introducing civil penalties for false or misleading safety evalua-
tion reports.254 Nevertheless, both bills include language to the effect that 
NHTSA may not condition testing or deployment of automated vehicles on 
review of the submissions, which raises questions about how NHTSA can nav-
igate situations where the agency feels it needs more information before it is 
satisfied with the safety level of a vehicle.255 
Although both bills are aimed at the public safety objective, the AV START 
Act, with its requirement of a signature and civil penalty provisions, appears to 
require more accountability by entities submitting information.256 If the public 
knows that entities face consequences for submitting false information, public 
confidence in the submission process may increase and reduce public demands 
for more stringent regulatory actions.257 Conversely, these accountability provi-
sions, coupled with mandatory reporting, may chill innovation and move testing 
off of public roadways or to other less regulated jurisdictions.258 
E. An Alternative Method for Self-Certification:  
The FAA’s Type Approval Process 
Manufacturers of new motor vehicles in the United States must attest 
compliance with applicable FMVSS through self-certification.259 An alterna-
                                                                                                                           
 251 AV START Act § 9; SELF DRIVE Act § 4; see AV GUIDANCE 2.0, supra note 24, at 16 (dis-
cussing the contents of the Voluntary Safety Self-Assessment). 
 252 See SELF DRIVE Act § 4 (discussing the scope of rulemaking for the safety assessment certi-
fication). 
 253 See AV START Act § 9 (listing the subject areas that need to be addressed in a safety evalua-
tion report); see also supra text accompanying note 117 (listing the subject areas). 
 254 See AV START Act § 9 (discussing signature requirements and civil penalties). 
 255 See id. (referring to NHTSA’s review authority); SELF DRIVE Act § 4 (same).  
 256 See AV START Act § 9 (including signature requirements and civil penalties); SELF DRIVE 
Act § 4 (lacking signature requirements and civil penalties). 
 257 See Laing, supra note 221 (discussing the current Voluntary Safety Self-Assessment program 
and noting, “the paperwork already voluntarily submitted does little to reassure the driving public that 
vigorous testing is being done”). 
 258 See id. (quoting Deputy NHTSA Administrator Heidi King as saying “[k]eeping an open mind 
to technology that is still developing is why NHTSA has adopted a voluntary approach to safety dis-
closures” and “[w]e believe that a voluntary approach is appropriate at this point in the development 
of the emerging technology because a need to regulate hasn’t been demonstrated”). 
 259 See 49 C.F.R. § 567.4 (discussing self-certification requirements). 
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tive to self-certification is a regulatory framework called type approval.260 
Type approval is a process under which a manufacturer of a product must get 
preapproval from a regulator before offering the product for sale.261 Type ap-
proval, or “type certification,” is used by the FAA in the United States to regu-
late new aircraft.262 
Unlike self-certification, where NHTSA is not actively involved in the 
design, testing, and introduction of a motor vehicle, the FAA is actively in-
volved in each phase throughout the type certification process.263 As a result, 
the FAA and the applicant seeking type certification have a close working rela-
tionship throughout the process.264 The FAA type certification process for air-
craft is divided into five phases: conceptual design, requirements definition, 
compliance planning, implementation, and post-certification.265 
The conceptual design phase begins when an applicant decides to seek 
type certification for an aircraft.266 Thereafter, an applicant may receive pre-
project guidance from the FAA on technical questions and hold a familiariza-
tion meeting to bring the agency up to speed on the design of the applicant’s 
aircraft.267 The conceptual design phase concludes with the applicant’s submis-
sion of a certification plan.268 Among the items the certification plan must ad-
dress are: (1) the design of the aircraft, (2) a plan for compliance with applica-
                                                                                                                           
 260 See BILL CANIS & RICHARD K. LATTANZIO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43399, U.S. AND EU 
MOTOR VEHICLE STANDARDS: ISSUES FOR TRANSATLANTIC TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 10 (2014), 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=751039 [https://perma.cc/6RUY-LHG7] (noting Europe uses type 
approval for the regulation of motor vehicles). 
 261 See FAQ—Type Approval of Vehicles, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/growth/
sectors/automotive/technical-harmonisation/faq-auto_en [https://perma.cc/6WBD-6W4G] (detailing 
the type approval process for motor vehicles in Europe). 
 262 See Type Certification, FAA Order No. 8110.4C 13 (Mar. 28, 2007), faa.gov/document
Library/media/Order/FAA_Order_8110_4C_Chg_6.pdf (describing the type certification process). 
 263 See id. (discussing the scope of type certification). 
 264 See AEROSPACE INDUS. ASS’N ET AL., THE FAA AND INDUSTRY GUIDE TO PRODUCT CERTI-
FICATION 13 (3d ed. 2017), https://www.faa.gov/aircraft/air_cert/design_approvals/media/cpi_guide.
pdf [https://perma.cc/EN2J-68YZ] (charting the roles of the FAA and the applicant). In light of con-
cerns arising from two crashes involving Boeing 737 MAX aircraft, discussed infra Part III, some 
“[l]awmakers have criticized the [FAA] for having a cozy a relationship with Boeing and handing 
over too much of the certification tasks to the manufacturer.” Leslie Josephs, FAA Plans New Safety 
Division as Post-Boeing Max Scrutiny Ramps Up, CNBC (Dec. 11, 2019, 7:57 AM), https://
www.cnbc.com/2019/12/11/faa-plans-new-safety-division-as-post-boeing-max-scrutiny-ramps-up.
html [https://perma.cc/PWP3-CZAN]. 
 265 See AEROSPACE INDUS. ASS’N ET AL., supra note 264, at 12 (discussing the phases of certifi-
cation). 
 266 See Type Certification, supra note 262, at 20 (detailing the conceptual design phase). This 
phase may include a process orientation where the applicant meets with a representative from the 
Aircraft Certification Office to learn the procedures and requirements for type certification. Id. 
 267 See id. (detailing the subtasks of the conceptual design phase). The subtasks are: process ori-
entation, pre-project guidance, familiarization briefing, and certification plan. Id. 
 268 See id. at 21 (discussing certification plans). All applicants must submit a certification plan 
and ensure the plan is up to date throughout the process. Id. 
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ble regulations and how compliance will be shown, (3) the documentation that 
will demonstrate compliance, (4) where the aircraft will operate and how it 
will be maintained, (5) whether exemptions from airworthiness standards are 
needed, and (6) if there are special conditions, such as novel or unusual design 
features.269 In the requirements definition phase, the applicant submits an appli-
cation for type certification.270 The FAA creates a certification project plan to 
coordinate the schedule and resources needed from the agency.271 When both the 
application for type certification and the certification project plan are complete, 
the applicant and the FAA jointly develop a project-specific certification plan to 
coordinate activities between the parties and establish timelines and goals.272 
This process is followed by the establishment of a certification basis where ap-
plicable airworthiness standards that the aircraft must meet are identified.273 
In the compliance planning phase, the FAA certification team decides 
where to focus its attention.274 If rulemaking, exemptions, or special conditions 
are needed for compliance, these are areas to which the FAA will be atten-
tive.275 Additionally, the FAA will focus on critical safety areas that require 
complex means of compliance.276 At this time, the project-specific certification 
plan should be complete, indicating that the FAA is confident that effective 
implementation of the plan would result in compliance.277 
The implementation phase puts the project-specific certification plan into 
action and consists of compliance data generation activities, compliance substan-
tiation activities, and compliance finding activities.278 Compliance data genera-
                                                                                                                           
 269 See id. at 21–22 (noting the essential components of a certification plan). A type certification plan 
for a complex project need not have all the information if the information is not yet known. Id. at 21. 
 270 See id. at 22 (discussing the requirements definition phase). A project manager is selected to 
represent the Aircraft Certification Office and coordinates the selection of a certification team. See id. 
at 23–24 (detailing the role of a project manager). 
 271 See id. at 29 (explaining the certification project plan). The certification project plan is “a 
living document . . . used [internally] to coordinate schedules, responsibilities, and personnel re-
sources between the accountable directorate and project Aircraft Certification Office.” Id. at 6. 
 272 See id. at 30 (discussing the project-specific certification plan). “The [project specific certifi-
cation plan] combines information from the applicant’s certification plan and the FAA’s [certification 
project plan] with additional project details to support an effective certification project. It is also the 
depository for milestones, performance measures, and information unique to the certification project.” 
Id. 
 273 See id. (discussing the certification basis). As a part of determining the certification basis, the 
inquiry may also explore whether different avenues for compliance are necessary, such as exemptions 
or special conditions. Id. at 31. 
 274 See id. at 37 (detailing the compliance planning phase). 
 275 See id. (explaining the FAA’s role in the compliance planning phase). 
 276 See id. (discussing the compliance planning phase). The FAA also takes the level of sophisti-
cation and experience of the applicant into consideration when determining where to focus its re-
sources. Id. Likewise, the FAA will delegate compliance responsibilities to the applicant and establish 
oversight criteria in areas where it has trust and confidence in the applicant. Id. 
 277 See id. at 39 (discussing the project-specific certification plan). 
 278 See id. at 41 (detailing the implementation phase). 
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tion activities include conformity inspections to confirm that the prototype air-
craft is manufactured in accordance with the design specifications and schemat-
ics.279 Compliance substantiation activities involve the applicant submitting 
compliance and flight test data reports to demonstrate that the data show the air-
craft is compliant with applicable regulations.280 Compliance finding activities 
comprise FAA review of the compliance data and test results, inspections to 
check conformity, and flight certification tests with FAA personnel to verify test 
data and ensure compliance.281 This is followed by the creation and determina-
tion of maintenance requirements, instructions for continued airworthiness, flight 
testing to confirm function and reliability, and the development of the aircraft 
flight manual.282 If these steps result in the FAA finding compliance, the aircraft 
is type certificated and an airworthiness certificate is issued.283 
Post-certification activities include the preparation of a certification 
summary report and continued airworthiness activities to ensure that, over the 
aircraft’s lifetime, the aircraft’s level of safety does not degrade.284 The FAA 
may also conduct a special certification review if an event or subsequent find-
ing indicates a potential safety problem.285 
                                                                                                                           
 279 See id. at 43 (discussing the implementation phase). This phase also includes a variety of other 
inspections and engineering tests, as well as the grant of an experimental airworthiness certificate and 
the performance of test flights. See id. at 44–46 (listing inspection requirements and discussing the 
process to obtain an experimental airworthiness certificate). Among other reasons, experimental air-
worthiness certificates are “issued to operate an aircraft that does not have a type certificate . . . and is 
in a condition for safe operation” in order to demonstrate compliance with applicable regulations. 
Experimental Category, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/aircraft/air_cert/airworthiness_
certification/sp_awcert/experiment/ [https://perma.cc/D4W3-ENBV]. 
 280 See Type Certification, supra note 262, at 47–49 (discussing compliance substantiation activi-
ties). 
 281 See id. at 50–52 (detailing compliance finding activities). 
 282 See id. at 54–56 (discussing the final stages of the implementation phase). 
 283 See id. at 56–57 (discussing the process for issuing type certification). The FAA issues two 
types of airworthiness certificates: a Standard Airworthiness Certificate and a Special Airworthiness 
Certificate. Airworthiness Certification, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/aircraft/air_
cert/airworthiness_certification/aw_overview/ [https://perma.cc/EML9-MYVH]. A Standard Air-
worthiness Certificate, or FAA Form 8100-2, is issued for aircraft categorized as: normal, utility, 
acrobatic, commuter, transport, manned free balloons, and special classes. Standard Airworthiness 
Certificate, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/aircraft/air_cert/airworthiness_certification/
std_awcert/ [https://perma.cc/8Z5R-Z3CQ]. A Special Airworthiness Certificate, or FAA Form 8130-7, 
is issued for aircraft that are used for restricted categories such as agriculture or surveying, experimental 
uses, or for aircraft that are primarily operated for pleasure seeking and personal use. Special Airworthi-
ness Certificate, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/aircraft/air_cert/airworthiness_certification/
sp_awcert/ [https://perma.cc/Q5YY-KUBG]. 
 284 See Type Certification, supra note 262, at 58 (discussing the post-certification phase). 
 285 See id. at 59 (discussing the special certification review process). The special certification 
review “[t]horoughly explore[s] every significant aspect and ramification of the potential safety prob-
lem in question” and concludes with a “[c]onsider[ation of] the adequacy of the applicable regulations 
and policy material.” Id. 
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III. TYPE APPROVAL: AN ALTERNATIVE WAY FORWARD  
FOR REGULATING AUTOMATED VEHICLES 
This Part explores type approval as utilized by the FAA and analyzes 
whether its application as a tool to regulate automated vehicles would achieve 
an appropriate balance between maximizing innovation and ensuring public 
safety.286 Notwithstanding recent events explored in more detail below, type 
approval presents an attractive alternative to the current model of self-
certification for regulating automated vehicles.287 In particular, the FAA type 
certification process represents a generally respected regulatory framework 
evidenced by the fact that, since 2009, U.S.-based airlines carried over seven 
billion passengers and incurred only one passenger fatality.288 
Before discussing type approval as it relates to automated vehicles, it is 
instructive to detail the circumstances surrounding recent crashes overseas of 
Boeing 737 MAX aircraft that have called into question the effectiveness of 
the FAA’s type certification process.289 In October 2018, a Boeing 737 MAX 8 
aircraft, operated by Lion Air, crashed shortly after takeoff in Indonesia, killing 
all 189 people on board.290 In March 2019, a second Boeing 737 MAX 8, op-
erated by Ethiopian Airlines, crashed shortly after takeoff from Addis Ababa 
and killed all 157 people on board.291 Investigations into the similarities be-
tween the two crashes led investigators to conclude that a malfunction with an 
automated system, designed to force the nose of the aircraft down to prevent a 
stall, caused the crashes by putting the planes into “uncontrollable nose 
dives.”292 This brought immediate attention to the type certification process for 
                                                                                                                           
 286 See infra notes 286–334 and accompanying text. 
 287 See AV GUIDANCE 1.0, supra note 24, at 72 (analyzing different proposals to regulate auto-
mated vehicles). 
 288 See Michael Laris, ‘It Appeared That We Had Time’: How the FAA Missed a Chance to Save 
Jennifer Riordan, WASH. POST (Dec. 2, 2019, 7:58 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/
trafficandcommuting/it-appeared-that-we-had-time-how-the-faa-missed-a-chance-to-save-jennifer-
riordan/2019/12/02/671d48c2-ef81-11e9-89eb-ec56cd414732_story.html [https://perma.cc/4Q2N-
9M8X] (“[O]ver the past decade U.S. airlines have carried 7 billion passengers around the country 
with just one fatality.”); Accidents Involving Passenger Fatalities: U. S. Airlines (Part 121) 1982 – 
Present, NAT’L TRANS. SAFETY BD., https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/data/Pages/paxfatal.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/THX3-GNS8] (noting a February 12, 2009, Colgan Air crash that resulted in pas-
senger fatalities on a U.S. airline). 
 289 David Schaper, Safety Experts Slam Boeing and FAA for Design and Approval of 737 Max 
Jets, NPR (Oct. 11, 2019, 8:35 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/10/11/769609684/safety-experts-slam-
boeing-and-faa-for-design-and-approval-of-737-max-jets [https://perma.cc/D2ZD-R3CQ]. 
 290 James Glanz et al., After a Lion Air 737 Max Crashed in October, Questions About the Plane 
Arose, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/03/world/asia/lion-air-plane-
crash-pilots.html [https://perma.cc/M4MF-CB7C]. 
 291 Hadra Ahmed et al., Ethiopian Airlines Plane Is the 2nd Boeing Max 8 to Crash in Months, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/10/world/africa/ethiopian-airlines-
plane-crash.html?action=click&module=Intentional&pgtype=Article [https://perma.cc/J32Q-QANQ]. 
 292 Schaper, supra note 289. 
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the 737 MAX and, in particular, the automated anti-stall system.293 Reports 
indicate a series of missteps contributed to the crash, including: (1) a design 
flaw in the automated anti-stall system, (2) that the FAA delegated evaluation 
of the system’s safety to Boeing, and (3) that pilots were not instructed on how 
to override the automated anti-stall system.294 The FAA in particular is under-
going scrutiny of its resources, the competence of its personnel to certify ex-
ceedingly complex aircraft systems, its close relationships with manufacturers, 
and policies that permit the agency to delegate certification tasks to manufac-
turers.295 
Criticisms of the FAA, however, do not necessitate the conclusion that the 
concept of type approval is flawed, but rather that the FAA failed to adequately 
conduct a robust and thorough type certification process for the Boeing 737 
MAX.296 Further, the fact that Boeing was delegated authority to certify the 
safety of its automated anti-stall system, and that this critical system failed so 
dramatically, actually buttresses the notion that self-certification for automated 
vehicle systems is not enough to guarantee public safety.297 If anything, the 
                                                                                                                           
 293 See id. (“A new report from a group of international aviation safety experts sharply criticizes 
both Boeing and the Federal Aviation Administration for the way the 737 Max airplane was devel-
oped and certified to fly . . . . Investigators link both crashes to a new automated flight control system 
on the plane known as MCAS, which acted on faulty data from a single angle of attack sensor . . . .”). 
 294 See Dominic Gates, Flawed Analysis, Failed Oversight: How Boeing, FAA Certified the Sus-
pect 737 MAX Flight Control System, SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 17, 2019), https://www.seattletimes.
com/business/boeing-aerospace/failed-certification-faa-missed-safety-issues-in-the-737-max-system-
implicated-in-the-lion-air-crash/ [https://perma.cc/K3FN-MQNV] (discussing certification of the 737 
MAX). One of Boeing’s goals in designing the 737 MAX was to ensure that pilots of earlier genera-
tion 737 aircraft did not need to undergo retraining in order to fly the 737 MAX. See Glanz, supra 
note 290. Although the automated anti-stall feature was not installed on earlier iterations of the 737, 
the FAA agreed with Boeing that pilots of the 737 MAX did not need to be informed of the change. 
Id. European aviation authorities originally thought that the feature would require pilots to undergo 
retraining, but ended up siding with the FAA and Boeing. Id. In contrast, Brazilian aviation authorities 
required pilots to be retrained in order to be familiar with the feature. Id. 
 295 See Schaper, supra note 289 (discussing criticisms of the FAA). 
 296 See id. (noting that “Boeing told the FAA the [anti-stall] system existed in a broad framework, 
but the company did not fully explain what the [anti-stall] systems would do nor how forcefully it 
would push the nose of the plane down” and quoting a report on the FAA’s actions that found “[t]he 
information and discussions about [the anti-stall system] were so fragmented and were delivered to 
disconnected groups” and that it “was difficult (for the FAA) to recognize the impacts and implica-
tions of this system”). 
 297 David Gelles & Natalie Kitroeff, Boeing and F.A.A. Faulted in Damning Report on 737 Max 
Certification, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/11/business/boeing-
737-max.html [https://perma.cc/6EVD-WBBV] (detailing the findings of a multi-agency task force in 
which the authors criticized the FAA’s reliance “on Boeing employees to vouch for the safety of the 
[737] Max” and indicated they “believed that if F.A.A. technical staff had been fully aware of the 
details of [the anti-stall system], the agency would probably have required additional scrutiny of the 
system that might have identified its flaws”). In particular, the report on the FAA’s shortcomings 
noted that automated systems are making the certification process more complex. Id. According to 
Christopher Hart, former chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board, “[a]s automation 
becomes more and more complex, pilots are less likely to fully understand it and more likely to have 
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Boeing 737 MAX crashes show that the FAA has to be more involved in the 
type certification process, not less.298 As noted above, and except for the recent 
737 MAX crashes, the type certification process has historically resulted in a 
high level of safety for aircraft that are very complex machines.299 Moreover, 
type certification, if executed correctly, requires much of an applicant.300 For 
example, one particularly technologically advanced aircraft, Boeing’s 787 
Dreamliner, took eight years to receive type certification from the FAA.301 
Still, a lengthy process may risk creating a bureaucratic morass for enti-
ties seeking to develop automated vehicles that is no more efficient than rule-
making.302 Moreover, self-certification has been the norm for the automotive 
industry in the United States for decades.303 A switch to type approval would 
mark a departure from current regulatory norms and add another regulatory 
layer of complexity to the status quo for entities seeking to develop automated 
vehicles.304 Additionally, because automated vehicles are an emerging technol-
ogy that requires specialized knowledge and technical skills, NHTSA may not 
be able to marshal the resources or engineering expertise needed to support a 
type approval structure, which was a crucial flaw in the FAA’s evaluation of 
the Boeing 737 MAX.305 Indeed, NHTSA has rejected type approval as a 
means to regulate automated vehicles.306 
Many U.S.-based automakers, however, already sell vehicles in Europe, 
where type approval for safety is the norm.307 Furthermore, although self-
                                                                                                                           
problems and more likely to encounter scenarios in real operations that they haven’t seen even in a 
simulator.” Id. 
 298 See id. (reporting that, “[t]o address [certification process] shortcomings, [a report by multiple 
agencies and jurisdictions] recommends that the F.A.A. update the certification process to allow the 
agency to be more involved early on”). 
 299 See supra note 288 and accompanying text discussing safety statistics. 
 300 See supra notes 260–285 and accompanying text discussing type certification. 
 301 See Ghim-Lay Yeo, 787 Wins Certification from FAA and EASA, FLIGHTGLOBAL (Aug. 26, 
2011), https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/787-wins-certification-from-faa-and-easa-361346/ 
[https://perma.cc/7WUT-A55Z] (noting Boeing applied for type certification on March 28, 2003, and 
received type certification on August 26, 2011). 
 302 See AV GUIDANCE 3.0, supra note 2, at 7 (noting NHTSA does not favor type approval). 
 303 See 49 U.S.C. § 30115 (2012) (listing self-certification requirements). 
 304 See AV GUIDANCE 3.0, supra note 2, at 7 (discussing why NHTSA does not favor type ap-
proval). 
 305 See Ohnsman, supra note 192 (arguing NHTSA lacks the technical capability to properly 
analyze a Safety Assessment Letter); Schaper, supra note 289 (noting the FAA “lack[ed] sufficient 
personnel with the expertise needed to fully evaluate . . . complex systems”). 
 306 See AV GUIDANCE 3.0, supra note 2, at 7 (discussing NHTSA’s stance on type approval). 
NHTSA noted that self-certification, as opposed to type approval, “more appropriately balances and 
promotes safety and innovation.” Id. 
 307 See CANIS & LATTANZIO, supra note 260, at 10 (noting Europe uses type approval for the 
regulation of motor vehicles as opposed to self-certification). The European Commission describes 
type approval in the EU as thus:  
2020] Regulation of Self-Driving Cars 335 
certification is used in the United States for motor vehicle safety, type approval 
is used to determine compliance with emissions regulations.308 The U.S. Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) sets emissions standards and conducts 
testing of motor vehicles to ascertain compliance before they may be sold in 
the United States.309 The EPA process resembles the type approval system in 
Europe for vehicle safety.310 Accordingly, automakers based in the United 
States already have experience with type approval.311 
Moreover, type approval need not supplant self-certification entirely.312 
For example, self-certification could be preserved for vehicle hardware not 
critical to the operation of the ADS, and type approval instituted for the ADS 
and ADS-critical hardware.313 Under this framework, self-certification would 
                                                                                                                           
The manufacturer makes available about a dozen or more pre-production cars that are 
equal to the final product. These prototypes are used to test compliance with EU safety 
rules (installation of lights, braking performance, stability control, crash tests with 
dummies), noise and emissions limits as well as production requirements (of individual 
parts and components, such as seats or steering wheel airbags). If all relevant require-
ments are met, the national authority delivers an EU vehicle type approval to the manu-
facturer authorising the sale of the vehicle type in the EU. . . . Every vehicle produced is 
then accompanied by a certificate of conformity, which is like the car’s birth certificate, 
in which the manufacturer certifies that the vehicle corresponds to the approved type. 
On the basis of this document, the vehicle can be registered anywhere in Europe. 
FAQ - Type Approval of Vehicles, supra note 261.  
 308 See CANIS & LATTANZIO, supra note 260, at 14 (discussing emissions compliance for motor 
vehicles in the United States). 
 309 See id. (discussing the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) process for certifying 
vehicles). The EPA has a three-step compliance strategy for light duty vehicle emissions. Id. The 
emissions of the subject vehicle are measured prior to production, on the assembly line, and after final 
production to ensure the vehicle remains compliant for a number of years. See id. (listing steps for 
certification). Vehicles are tested in a laboratory on a dynamometer (basically, a treadmill for cars), 
according to normal driving behavior. See id. (discussing the EPA’s testing procedures). EPA’s test-
ing procedures and its type approval process, however, are not foolproof. See Andrea Peterson & 
Brian Fung, The Tech Behind How Volkswagen Tricked Emissions Tests, WASH. POST (Sept. 22, 
2015, 12:37 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2015/09/22/the-tech-behind-
how-volkswagen-tricked-emissions-tests/?utm_term=.9460a048a5cc [https://perma.cc/Z4D4-QWW4] 
(detailing how Volkswagen programmed its diesel powered vehicles to detect that they were operating 
on a dynamometer and undergoing testing in order to activate auxiliary emission control devices (also 
known as defeat devices) that allowed the vehicles to pass the emissions test). 
 310 See CANIS & LATTANZIO, supra note 260, at 14 (discussing the U.S. emissions certification 
process as it compares to the self-certification process for safety). 
 311 See, e.g., Ford Motor Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 8, 2018) (noting Ford does busi-
ness in Europe). 
 312 See AV GUIDANCE 1.0, supra note 24, at 74–75 (discussing a hybrid self-certification/type 
approval process). 
 313 See id. at 74 (describing the contours of a hybrid self-certification/type approval process). For 
example, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) utilizes a hybrid self-
certification/pre-market approval process. Id. PHMSA uses self-certification for the “classification, 
containment, and commercial transportation of hazardous materials” and uses pre-market approval to 
sanction “certain types of transportation of hazardous materials.” Id. 
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be retained for all systems and components that are not essential to the opera-
tion of the ADS, such as seat belts and airbags.314 Type approval, meanwhile, 
would be implemented for the software that acts as the brain of the ADS and 
the sensors, lasers, cameras and other hardware that the ADS uses to operate 
the vehicle.315 Because software operating an ADS is extremely complex and 
critical to safety—similar to the automated anti-stall system in the Boeing 737 
MAX—it is essential that it undergo at least some review by regulators to de-
termine its capabilities.316 Relying on representations by manufacturers of the 
vehicle’s safety level—as evidenced by the FAA’s reliance on Boeing’s state-
ments that its anti-stall system was safe—is not enough to guarantee public 
safety.317 
Further, there are ways the FAA type certification process could be modi-
fied to better serve automated vehicle developers.318 Although FAA type certi-
fication takes years, the process could be winnowed down by focusing exclu-
sively on the implementation phase where the manufacturer shows compli-
ance.319 This would maximize innovation, to the extent possible, by involving 
the regulator at a later stage of design and after significant testing and proving 
occur.320 Likewise, the standards developers need to meet in order to gain type 
approval could be less technical, more performance-based, and tailored to the 
specific operational design domain.321 Consequently, NHTSA could focus on 
                                                                                                                           
 314 See id. at 75 (positing the framework for a hybrid self-certification/type approval process). 
 315 See id. (discussing the outlines of a hybrid self-certification/type approval process). 
 316 See Gelles & Kitroeff, supra note 297 (positing that if regulators knew more about the auto-
mated anti-stall system in the Boeing 737 MAX, they may have been able to determine the system 
was flawed). 
 317 See id. (noting “Boeing did not adequately explain to federal regulators how a crucial new 
[anti-stall] system on the plane worked” and that the FAA “relied heavily on Boeing employees to 
vouch for the safety of the [737] Max”). 
 318 See AV GUIDANCE 1.0, supra note 24, at 73 (noting differences between products regulated 
by the FAA and NHTSA). Differences identified are that the FAA only interacts with a small number 
of manufacturers and that the automotive industry produces vehicles “on a model-year basis [which] 
might create challenges . . . due to potential delays in the beginning of production of vehicle models 
caused by the length of the approval process.” Id. 
 319 See Type Certification, supra note 262, at 41 (detailing the implementation phase). In this 
scenario, NHTSA would focus on areas in the implementation phase for FAA type certification: com-
pliance data generation activities, compliance substantiation activities, and compliance finding activi-
ties. See id. (noting the subtasks of the implementation phase). For example, during compliance data 
generation activities, NHTSA would determine whether the subject automated vehicle meets its de-
sign specifications. See id. at 43 (discussing compliance data generation activities). Compliance sub-
stantiation activities would involve NHTSA analyzing test data provided by the developer to deter-
mine compliance. See id. at 47–49 (detailing compliance substantiation activities). Finally, compli-
ance finding activities would include on-road testing to evaluate performance and substantiate the test 
data. See id. at 50–52 (discussing compliance finding activities). 
 320 See AV GUIDANCE 1.0, supra note 24, at 73 (arguing an FAA style type approval process 
would require a lengthy timeframe). 
 321 See AV GUIDANCE 4.0, supra note 24, at 5 (discussing the need for regulations “that are as 
performance-based and non-prescriptive as possible and do not discriminate against American tech-
2020] Regulation of Self-Driving Cars 337 
how the automated vehicle performs on the road in its operational design do-
main as opposed to on paper.322 The result would be a type approval process 
that more resembles a driving test rather than an intrusive look into the design 
process.323 If NHTSA is lacking in resources or expertise, specialized third-
parties could be brought in to conduct the testing and evaluation on behalf of 
NHTSA, or certain tasks could be delegated to developers in a manner similar to 
the FAA’s type certification process, as long as those tasks are not critical to 
overall safety.324 Type approval also need not be adopted immediately and could 
be phased in to allow time for the technology to mature and for rulemaking on 
appropriate standards to be finalized.325 Deadlines for type approval decisions 
contingent on the applicant satisfactorily providing all the necessary information 
could similarly be instituted to lessen the possibility of delays in approval.326 
Finally, although type approval may interrupt innovation, it would have 
safety benefits.327 The close relationship between the entity developing the au-
tomated vehicle and the regulator allows for more transparency and scrutiny, 
assuming the regulator is properly resourced.328 Rather than relying on self-
certification from the manufacturer, type approval allows the regulator to de-
termine whether the automated vehicle is compliant with regulations before it 
operates on public roadways.329 If the public knows that automated vehicles 
are not permitted on roadways without regulatory approval, type approval may 
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increase public confidence in the technology.330 A robust type approval process 
could also prevent the kinds of accidents, such as the Uber crash in Arizona, 
that undermine public confidence and put the entire future of automated vehi-
cles at risk of a public backlash.331 Aside from serious mistakes made in the 
type certification of the Boeing 737 MAX, type approval presents the best path 
forward for automated vehicles because, unlike self-certification, it has the 
potential to provide public safety assurances while still allowing for innova-
tion.332 Unfortunately, however, instituting type approval for automated vehi-
cles would require congressional action.333 Although it appears unlikely Con-
gress has the appetite to adopt type approval for automated vehicles in the near 
term, this could change if current regulatory tools and legislative proposals 
prove inadequate to ensure public safety in the long term.334 
CONCLUSION 
Automated vehicles are coming. The key questions for policymakers, 
regulators, designers, manufacturers, and the general public moving forward 
are whether current regulatory schemes designed for a different era can keep 
pace with the technology, and whether policymakers can augment or adapt 
those schemes to further innovation and keep the public safe. Type approval, if 
instituted in a deliberate, thoughtful, and coordinated way with input from pol-
icymakers, regulators, developers, and other stakeholders, is a better alterna-
tive than the current scheme to ensure that innovation in the automated vehi-
cles space does not come at the expense of public safety. 
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